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Abstract
Assortative Matching between workers and ﬁrms provides evidence of the complementarities or
substitutes in production. The presence of complementarities is important for policies that aim to
achieve the optimal allocation of resources, for example unemployment insurance. We argue that
using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether Assortative Matching is positive
or negative. Even though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting, we can identify the strength,
i.e., the magnitude of the cross-partial, and the associated welfare loss. We show ﬁrst that the wage
for a given worker is non-monotonic in the type of his employer. This is due to the fact that in
a sorting model, wages reﬂect the opportunity cost of mismatch. We show analytically that this
non-monotonicity prevents standard ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to correlate with the true type of the ﬁrm.
We then propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of
search frictions. Knowing the strength of sorting facilitates the measurement of the output loss due
to mismatch.
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1 Introduction
Sorting of workers to jobs matters for the eﬃcient production of output in the economy. If there
are strong complementarities or substitutes between workers and jobs, the exact allocation has large
eﬃciency implications. In contrast, when complementarities are nearly absent, not much output is lost
from randomly allocating workers to jobs. This is important for policy, for example whether we want to
design an unemployment insurance program that provides incentives for workers to look for the “right”
job instead of accepting the ﬁrst oﬀer (see for example Acemoglu and Shimer 1999). Complementarities
and sorting also have profound implications for wage inequality across diﬀerently skilled workers (see
for example Sattinger 1975). Sorting based on complementarities is also the driving force in a variety
of applications: it is central to the argument of skill-biased technological change; it aﬀects the impact
of immigration on the domestic labor force; and it shapes the eﬀect of subsidies to education.
We address two questions in this work. First, we ask whether we can determine if more productive
workers are employed in more productive jobs. Second, we ask whether we can determine the magnitude
of the loss from mismatch when workers are not employed in the optimal ﬁrm. Both questions have
attracted recent interest because of the availability of worker-ﬁrm match data (see Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2006) for an overview) that gives a panel dimension of observations for each worker and ﬁrm.
When thinking about the answer to each of the questions, we focus on wage data only. While data on
proﬁts and output is also available, this is typically reported at the ﬁrm level and, therefore, it is not
very informative about the productivity of each individual job in the ﬁrm.1
The ﬁrst question – whether more productive workers work in more productive jobs – is a positive
exercise. It provides insights into the features of the production technology. If the answer is aﬃrmative
and there is positive sorting, it means that the inputs in production, worker skill and job productivity,
exhibits strong enough complementarities. The marginal product of a worker increases the better the
ﬁrm is, i.e., the technology is supermodular. Alternatively, if sorting is negative, this provides evidence
that inputs in production are substitutes and that the technology is submodular. The canonical example
of negative sorting is the work of a consultant, where the better consultants may be needed in the ﬁrms
that are currently least productive. Unfortunately, from our analysis we conclude that we cannot identify
the sign of sorting. Based on wage data alone, it is impossible to determine whether sorting is positive
or negative. The reason is that wages reﬂect a worker’s marginal product. Under complementarity, this
is high in productive jobs while it is low under substitutability. Wages alone thus do not allow us to
determine the ranking among ﬁrms, and it is not possible to ﬁnd out whether more able workers derive
their higher marginal product from more productive ﬁrms or not.
Second, we ask how large the gains are from matching workers to the appropriate ﬁrms, and cor-
respondingly, how big the losses are from mismatch. This question about the strength of sorting is
normative. It allows us to evaluate the eﬃciency gains from improved job search and other labor mar-
ket interventions. Our ﬁndings provide an aﬃrmative answer: we can identify the strength of sorting.
We propose a simple algorithm that allows us to back out (the absolute value of) the degree of com-
plementarity, even without information on the sign of sorting. The main source of identiﬁcation is the
search behavior by workers that diﬀers when the degree of complementarity is high, and when as a
1We further discuss the beneﬁts and limitations of additional data beyond wages below.
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result, sorting is important.
In addition to answering these two identiﬁcation questions, we also show that neither of these
questions can be answered with the widely cited method that analyzes the correlation between ﬁrm and
worker ﬁxed eﬀects from wage regressions. This method is ﬁrst proposed in a seminal paper by Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis (1999), AKM henceforth. The obtained correlation aims to answer the sign and
strength questions in one: whether it is positive or negative and how big the coeﬃcient is. The idea
is that more productive ﬁrms pay higher wages than lower wage ﬁrms irrespective of the exact worker
they hire, and the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect therefore recovers the ranking of the ﬁrms. We show analytically
that obtaining the ﬁrm ranking is not feasible due to the way wages are determined in equilibrium, and
as a result, the correlation coeﬃcient is not capable of informing us about the sign nor the strength.
Our analysis builds on the most standard sorting model. We start from the assignment problem
analyzed by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1971), and popularized by Becker
(1973). In the Beckerian theory, high type workers match with high productivity jobs when there are
complementarities. Wages are set competitively and reﬂect the marginal contribution of a worker’s
skill. Most importantly, even oﬀ the equilibrium allocation, the possible wages paid to mismatched
partners are constrained by equilibrium: oﬀ-equilibrium wages must be such that they do not induce
agents from knowingly deviating from the equilibrium allocation. One innovation of our approach is to
explore not only the properties of the wages along the Beckerian allocation, but also of the wages for
mismatched agents that happen to “tremble” oﬀ the equilibrium path. The properties of those wages
by mismatched pairs are crucial for our identiﬁcation strategy. Once we introduce mismatch as an
equilibrium outcome due to search frictions, we can actually link the properties of those wages from
mismatch to actually observed wages.
We ﬁnd that wages of a given worker have an inverted U-shape around the optimal allocation, which
corresponds to the frictionless wage. This non-monotonicity reﬂects the opportunity cost of a ﬁrm to
match with an inappropriate worker type. For a given worker, wages are low if he matches with a “bad”
ﬁrm, because the value that is generated is low. Maybe less obviously, his wage is also low if he matches
with a very “good” ﬁrm. The reason is that higher productivity ﬁrms have to be compensated for their
willingness to match with a “bad” worker because it destroys their opportunity to match with a “good”
worker. Under complementarities that ﬁrm has a disproportionately larger marginal product with the
good worker. This leads to the highest compensation if a worker meets the “right” ﬁrm, rather than
a wage schedule that is increasing everywhere in the type of ﬁrm. To see that the inverted U-shape is
actually part of any sorting equilibrium with search frictions, observe that the set of eligible partners
is bounded by those matches where the match surplus is zero relative to the value of continued search.
These bounds in general arise both for low type ﬁrms that are too ineﬃcient and for high type ﬁrms
that rather wait for a better worker, while for intermediate ﬁrm types the surplus is strictly positive.
Any bargaining procedure that pays wages that are monotonic in the surplus after accounting for the
outside option of attracting a more appropriate type will therefore result in wages being non-monotonic
in ﬁrm type.
Because of the non-monotonic eﬀect of ﬁrm type on wages, the wage cannot be decomposed in an
additively separable ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed eﬀect. We show analytically that the misspeciﬁcation is not
innocuous: for the most common speciﬁcations in the literature the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect misses any direct
2
connection to the true type of the ﬁrm.
In spite of the fact that we cannot identify the sign with any procedure, we develop a method that
enables us to identify the strength of sorting. We thus oﬀer an alternative to remedy the shortcomings
of the ﬁxed eﬀects regression. Identiﬁcation derives from the distinct features of the search behavior of
workers under diﬀerent degrees of complementarities. First, we extract from the range of wages paid
what the cost of search is. The highest observed wage corresponds to the wage obtained in a frictionless
market and we use this to order the workers and obtain the type distribution. Likewise, we can obtain
an order of the ﬁrms by the level of wages that they pay. The diﬀerence between the highest and
the lowest wage corresponds to the cost of search. Second, given the search cost, the fraction of the
ﬁrm population that an agent is willing to match with, i.e., the matching set, identiﬁes the strength
of the complementarity as expressed by the (absolute value of the) cross-partial of the production
function. This is possible because the strength of the cross-partial directly reﬂects the output loss due
to mismatch. We can relate our method of identiﬁcation to the analysis in Gautier and Teulings (2004,
2006) of second-order approximations to inﬁnite-horizon search models. We show that identiﬁcation
is ensured without knowledge of the sorting pattern, without approximations to the case of negligible
search costs, and in the presence of type-dependent costs, and we can do this in few transparent steps.
But this comes at the cost of simpliﬁed economic and econometric modeling assumptions.
The setup of our economy is very simple with dynamics reduced to two periods. The objective is to
solve analytically what the standard inﬁnite horizon models cannot deliver. This makes the models very
speciﬁc, but in section 5 we show that our insights extend to the fully dynamic steady state models.
We also discuss alternative models and argue that whenever wages reﬂect the competitively determined
outside option, they must necessarily be non-monotonic in ﬁrm type.
Related Literature. Given the importance of sorting, a large body of recent empirical literature
has estimated whether sorting is positive or negative. As mentioned above, this renewed interest has
been catalyzed by the availability of worker-ﬁrm match data, surveyed e.g., in Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2006). Using the AKM method, several papers ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant or even negative correlation in
ﬁxed eﬀects between worker and ﬁrm types. This result has been replicated for a number of countries
including France, US, Denmark and Brazil. The result is taken as indication that Positive Assortative
Matching between workers and ﬁrms does not play a major role in the labor market.
AKM use matched employer-employee data to decompose wages into diﬀerent eﬀects related to
worker and ﬁrm characteristics. With unrestricted correlation among the eﬀects they are able to
estimate the ﬁrm and worker components of wages. The generality of their econometric approach
allows for many diﬀerent estimation techniques to determine each of the components. A by-product
of their contribution is a simple empirical measure of sorting that can be obtained by estimating a
log-wage equation in which wages are a function of a worker ﬁxed eﬀect, a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, and an
orthogonal error term: log푤푖푡 = 푎푖푡훽+훿푖+휓푗(푖,푡) +휀푖푡, where 푤푖푡 denotes the wage, 푎푖푡 are time varying
observables of workers, 훿푖 is a worker ﬁxed eﬀect, 휓푗 is the ﬁxed eﬀect of the ﬁrm 푗 at which worker 푖
is employed at time 푡, and 휀푖푡 is an orthogonal residual. That is, 휓푗 captures the average eﬀect that a
ﬁrm has on the wages of the workers that are willing to match with it. The correlation between 훿푖 and
휓푗 in a given match is taken as an estimate of the degree of sorting.
We show in our theoretical exercise that the assumption that the ﬁrm eﬀect is independent of the
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worker’s type is theoretically not justiﬁed in this setting. In particular, for those workers who are
matched with a ﬁrm that has a lower rank than their own, the wage increases when the ﬁrm type
increases because the worker-ﬁrm “ﬁt” improves. In contrast, workers who are matched with a higher
ranked ﬁrm see a decrease in the wage when the ﬁrm becomes better because the worker-ﬁrm “ﬁt”
deteriorates. We argue above that this implies that the correlation between the ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed
eﬀect cannot be taken as a measure of sorting.
The AKM ﬁndings have been extensively cited in the literature. In the ﬁrst instance, the method-
ology has been widely used to analyze sorting for many diﬀerent countries. It has repeatedly been
established in many matched employer-employee data that there is a small, or insigniﬁcant correlation
between the worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. The methodology has also been extended to include diﬀerent
aspects of sorting. For example, Combes, Duranton, Gobillon (2008) use the AKM methodology to
estimate the geographical degree of sorting.
In addition, there is an extensive literature leaning on the AKM (1999) ﬁxed eﬀects regression, both
in empirical and theoretical work. The fact that the correlation between the worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect
is small is interpreted in diﬀerent ways. For example in empirical work, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
analyze wage heterogeneity in a search model. They have no complementarities within occupations and
cite AKM as evidence for the absence of sorting. In contrast, Bender and von Wachter (2006) argue
that the small but signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcient obtained for the French labor market is indeed
evidence in favor of sorting. Similarly, theoretical work citing the results of AKM interpret them either
way. Anderson and Smith (2010) for example justify the absence of sorting to motivate a matching
model with learning that does not generate sorting in equilibrium. They cite AKM as evidence. Shimer
(2005) justiﬁes the use of complementarities and the resulting sorting based on AKM despite them
ﬁnding a small eﬀect. The interpretation is that the workers’ unobserved characteristics have a small
but statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts, i.e., there is sorting. Cabrales, Calvo´-Armengol and
Pavoni (2008) also cite AKM to argue that the degree of sorting is on the increase over time.
Beyond the use and citation of the AKM method and results, other work has singled out shortcom-
ings of the ﬁxed eﬀects regression. Simulations of search models with strong complementarities and
sorting nonetheless generate small or even negative correlations of the simulated ﬁxed eﬀects of workers
and ﬁrms. Lopes de Melo (2008), Lise, Meghir and Robin (2008), and Bagger and Lentz (2008) study
variations of structural labor search models with an inﬁnite horizon, and simulate as well as estimate
those models with matched employer-employee data. Our objective is to provide a much simpler frame-
work, but one that allows us to investigate theoretically how to measure the extent of sorting and to
derive the correlation between ﬁxed eﬀects analytically. Lopes de Melo (2008) also reports correlations
between worker ﬁxed eﬀects as a measure of sorting, and our approach highlights why this captures
some (but not all) the relevant information on the importance of sorting. In particular, it captures the
range in which workers accept jobs, since a narrow acceptance range means that the workers at a ﬁrm
are rather similar. This arises when sorting is very important, but may also arise simply because search
costs are small, and a careful consideration of both forces is necessary.
And in an approach related to our own, Gautier and Teulings (2004, 2006) allow for an inﬁnite
horizon and a richer econometric environment with measurement error while relying on second-order
approximations. They restrict the match surplus function to insure that matching is positive assortative,
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and thus cannot address whether their framework permits the identiﬁcation of the sign or the strength
if that restriction were relaxed. Given our results, we suspect that recovering the sign will be infeasible
even in their model.2 On the other hand their estimates about the strength of sorting will remain
valid even if one is agnostic about the matching patterns, as long as search costs are type-independent
(below, we develop alternatives for type-dependent search costs within our framework). Thus, we
believe that there is a multitude of ways (such as our approach, Gautier and Teuling’s second-order
approximations, or other approaches under sign restrictions) that allow progress on the main policy-
relevant issue without relying on the exact knowledge of the sorting pattern (for which additional data
might be required). We return to this in the discussion section.
One alternative approach is to use proﬁt data in addition to wage data. Clearly, if we have infor-
mation on prices from both sides of the market, we know the total output for all matched pairs and
therefore the technology. This immediately allows us to back out both the sign and the strength of
sorting. This approach has been taken by Haltiwanger, Lane and Speltzer (1999), van den Berg and
van Vuuren (2003), Mendes, van den Berg, Lindeboom (2007) to estimate the performance of search
models. With sorting, this immediately leads to identiﬁcation. The problem is that in practice this is
diﬃcult because output and proﬁt measures are usually only provided at the level of the ﬁrm or the
establishment, and attributing them to each individual worker is diﬃcult. In the absence of job level
proﬁt data, one would need a theory of the ﬁrm with heterogenous agents (for example Eeckhout and
Pinheiro (2009)) to attribute the ﬁrm level proﬁts to each individual job. Instead, the objective of our
paper is to investigate the extent to which the two questions above can be answered from wage data
alone. This has the great advantage that data on wages is available for each individual worker and is
of high quality.
Finally, there is also an extensive literature on hedonic models that are thought to be not identiﬁed.
Hedonic models characterize the pricing of goods that consist of bundles of attributes (housing, for
example). The focus is on multidimensional characteristics and the patterns of sorting based on those
characteristics. Recently, Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2002, 2004) show that the hedonic model is
generically nonparametrically identiﬁed, despite the fact that the sorting equilibrium in a single market
implies no exclusion restrictions. They show that the commonly used linearization strategies cause
the identiﬁcation problem because the hedonic model is generically nonlinear. In this class of models
with multidimensional characteristics, Dupuy (2010) observes that in a combined matching-hedonic
model with sorting on both skills and preferences, wages are a function of both preferences and worker
attributes. This can result in non-positive dependence of wages on ﬁrm types since the ﬁrm types do
not constitute a complete order common to all agents. Of course, one can make this observation even
in the simple matching model by relaxing the monotonicity assumption, i.e., output is not everywhere
increasing in ﬁrm and/or worker type (see also section 5).
2We discuss the case of discounting explicitly in Section 5. Allowing for discounting rather than ﬁxed search costs will
open some avenue for sign-identiﬁcation, but this possibility vanishes with a decreasing discount rate between matching
opportunities, which is assumed in most approximation-strategies.
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2 The Model
The basic primitives of our simple matching model build on Becker (1973). There is a unit mass of
workers and a unit mass of ﬁrms. Workers and ﬁrms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity.
Workers draw their type 푥 from distribution Γ(푥) with smooth density 훾(푥) on [0, 1]. Firms draw their
type 푦 from distribution Υ(푦) with smooth density 휐(푦) on [0, 1].
When types 푥 and 푦 form a match, they produce positive output 푓(푥, 푦) ≥ 0 whilst having an
outside option of remaining unmatched. We assume that workers and ﬁrms can be ranked in terms
of their productivity, i.e., 푓푥 > 0 and 푓푦 > 0. Then it is without loss of generality to index a worker
by his rank in terms of productivity, i.e., by the fraction of workers that are less productive then him.
Similarly, we can identify each ﬁrm by its rank in the distribution of ﬁrm productivities. This means
that Γ(⋅) = Υ(⋅) = 푥, i.e., the distributions are uniform. Assume that workers who do not get matched
obtain a payoﬀ of zero, and since output is non-negative, all agents will prefer to match.
For the assignment of workers to ﬁrms the cross-partial of the production function is important. We
do not restrict the sign of the cross-partial since this will be instrumental in determining whether there
is positive or negative assortative matching. Denote by ℱ the class of all functions 푓 that are monotonic:
푓푥, 푓푦 > 0; and that have a monotonic marginal product: 푓푥푦(푥, 푦) is either always positive or always
negative.3 The assumption that the cross-partial does not change sign allows us to unambiguously talk
about positive or negative sorting. Production functions with complementarities (푓푥푦 > 0) are in set
ℱ+ ⊂ ℱ . Production functions with substitutes (푓푥푦 < 0) are in set ℱ− ⊂ ℱ .
To illustrate the implications of our analysis we will illustrate our results for the following examples
of production functions
푓+(푥, 푦) = 훼푥휃푦휃 + ℎ(푥) + 푔(푦), (1)
푓−(푥, 푦) = 훼푥휃(1− 푦)휃 + ℎ(푥) + 푔(푦), (2)
where 푔(⋅) and ℎ(⋅) are increasing functions and 훼 ≥ 0 and 휃 > 0 are parameters that indicate the
strength of the complementarities. We assume that 푔(푦) is such that higher type ﬁrms produce higher
output even under the second speciﬁcation. It is obvious that 푓+ ∈ ℱ+ and 푓− ∈ ℱ−.
2.1 The Frictionless Environment
In the absence of frictions the matching market is competitive. An assignment of workers 푥 to ﬁrms 푦 is
denoted by 휇, i.e., 휇(푥) = 푦 means that worker 푥 gets hired by ﬁrm 푦. A market equilibrium speciﬁes an
assignment 휇 between 푥’s and 푦’s and some wage schedule 푤(푥, 푦) that determines the split of output
between the worker and the ﬁrm that are matched. The payoﬀ to the worker is 푤(푥, 푦) and the payoﬀ
to the ﬁrm is 휋(푥, 푦) = 푓 (푥, 푦) − 푤(푥, 푦). Both workers and ﬁrms take the wage schedule as given.
The tuple of functions (휇,푤) is an equilibrium if there is no worker-ﬁrm pair that could do better by
matching amongst themselves than with their current partners,4 i.e.,
푤(푥, 휇(푥)) + 휋(휇−1(푦), 푦) ≥ 푓(푥, 푦), ∀푥, 푦 (3)
3Later, in section 5 we discuss the virtues of relaxing these assumptions.
4It is well-known that a strict cross-partial yields a one-to-one mapping 휇(⋅) in equilibrium. In general 휇(⋅) is a
correspondence, with the equilibrium deﬁnition extended to all pairs in that correspondence.
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and no agent prefers to remain single, i.e., 푤(푥, 휇(푥)) ≥ 0 for all 푥 and 휋(휇−1(푦), 푦) ≥ 0 for all 푦.
We derive the main prediction of Becker’s (1973) model concerning the wages in the economy.
Rearranging (3) such that only proﬁts are on the left hand side and recalling that 휋(푥, 푦) = 푓 (푥, 푦)−
푤(푥, 푦) immediately reveals the equilibrium proﬁts for ﬁrm 푦 must satisfy:
max
푥
푓(푥, 푦)− 푤(푥, 휇(푥)).
This yields the ﬁrst order condition
푓푥(푥, 푦)− 푑푤(푥, 휇(푥))
푑푥
= 0. (4)
In equilibrium this has to hold evaluated at 푦 = 휇(푥), and therefore the equilibrium wage scedule
푤★(푥) := 푤(푥, 휇(푥)) can be obtained by integrating (4) along the equilibrium path:
푤★(푥) =
∫ 푥
0
푓푥(푥˜, 휇(푥˜))푑푥˜+ 푤0, (5)
where the constant of integration 푤0 ∈ [0,min 푓(푥, 푦)] can be thought of as some exogenous bargaining
rule that splits the surplus between the lowest types in case these types have a positive surplus over
remaining single.5 Observe that the worker obtains exactly his marginal product along the equilibrium
allocation. Therefore, equilibrium proﬁts of type 푦 are given by output minus the wage 푤★ with the
optimal worker 휇−1(푦). This can be re-written as
휋★(푦) =
∫ 푦
0
푓푦(휇
−1(푦˜), 푦˜)푑푦˜ + 푓(0, 0)− 푤0. (6)
Furthermore, we know from Becker’s analysis that matching is positive assortative when the production
function is supermodular (푓푥푦 > 0), in which case 휇(푥) = 푥. Under submodularity (푓푥푦 < 0) in
equilibrium the matching is negative assortative and 휇(푥) = 1− 푥, since lower type ﬁrms have a higher
marginal value for better workers and are willing to pay more for them.
2.2 On the equilibrium path
We show that in this simple competitive model the sign of sorting – i.e., the sign of the cross-partial
– cannot be identiﬁed from wage data alone. We will ﬁrst illustrate the result by considering our
restricted class of production functions outlined above and then present the general theorem. Suppose
the underlying production technology is not known and the true technology is either one of the two
example technologies 푓+ given in (1) or 푓− given in (2). By (5) the wages under 푓+ and 푓− are
푤★,+(푥) =
∫ 푥
0
푓+푥 (푥˜, 푥˜)푑푥˜+ 푤0 =
훼
2
푥2휃 + ℎ(푥)− ℎ(0) + 푤0
푤★,−(푥) =
∫ 푥
0
푓−푥 (푥˜, 1− 푥˜)푑푥˜+ 푤0 =
훼
2
푥2휃 + ℎ(푥)− ℎ(0) + 푤0.
5When 푓(0, 0) = 0, then 푤0 = 0 and the wage schedule is uniquely determined. Otherwise there are a continuum of
competitive equilibria associated with diﬀerent 푤0, and we assume that the speciﬁc split 푤0 is a primitive determined by
some exogenous bargaining rule.
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Figure 1: The solid line gives equilibrium wages 푤(푥, 휇(푥)), the dashed line proﬁts 휋(푥, 휇(푥)), and the
dotted line total output 푓(푥, 휇(푥)) under 푓+ = 푥푦 + 푦 [left] and 푓− = 푥(1− 푦) + 푦 [right] with 푤0 = 0.
Under both technologies the wages on the equilibrium path are exactly identical, and from wage data
alone one cannot distinguish between positive and negative sorting. The problem is obtaining the order
of the ﬁrms. If we only have wage data and no proﬁt data, and we derive the order on the ﬁrms by
ranking them by increasing wages, we will obtain two diﬀerent orders depending on whether we have
complements or substitutes. To see this, observe that under positive assortative matching (henceforth
PAM) higher type ﬁrms pay higher wages along the equilibrium path whereas under negative assortative
matching (NAM) higher type ﬁrms pay lower wages. In the former 푤(푦, 푦) = 훼푦
2휃
2 is increasing in 푦,
in the latter 푤(1 − 푦, 푦) = 훼(1−푦)2휃2 is decreasing in 푦. This result is true for any general production
technology as summarized in the proposition that follows below.
In Figure 1 the solid line shows for each worker 푥 his wage, the dashed line shows the proﬁts of the
ﬁrm that is matched to worker 푥, and the dotted line gives the total output that they produce. The left
panel depicts these for the production function 푓+ = 푥푦+ 푦, while the right panel covers the outcomes
for production function 푓− = 푥(1 − 푦) + 푦. If one only observes the wages according to the solid line,
both cases look identical. The cases only diﬀer in proﬁts and total outputs. For example, the dashed
line of the proﬁts of the ﬁrm matched to worker 푥 is decreasing in worker type 푥 only under 푓−. While
higher 푦 ﬁrms have higher proﬁts, in this case higher 푥 workers are matched with lower 푦 ﬁrms who
obtain lower proﬁts. That is, even under NAM 휋★,−(푦) = 푦 + (1−푦)
2
2 is increasing in 푦 even though
휋−(푥, 휇(푥)) is decreasing in 푥. The payoﬀs under both technologies are summarized in the following
table.
푓+ = 푥푦 + 푦 푓− = 푥(1− 푦) + 푦
푤(푥, 휇(푥) 푥
2
2
푥2
2
휋(푥, 휇(푥)) 푥
2
2 + 푥
푥2
2 + 1− 푥
푓(푥, 휇(푥)) 푥2 + 푥 푥2 + 1− 푥
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Proposition 1 For any production function 푓 ∈ ℱ+ that induces positive sorting there exists a pro-
duction function 푓 ∈ ℱ− that induces negative sorting and the equilibrium wages 푤∗(푥) are identical
under both production functions.
Proof. In Appendix.
2.3 Oﬀ the equilibrium path
Identiﬁcation needs variation. Identiﬁcation of sorting from equilibrium wages may be diﬃcult simply
because there is no independent variation across ﬁrms and workers. In the frictionless case workers sort
perfectly in the sense that each type of ﬁrm attracts exactly one worker type. Even if workers became
unemployed and could match again later without frictions, the panel dimension would not allow us to
identify a separate eﬀect for ﬁrms and workers, because workers will always end up in the same type of
ﬁrm. There would not be any wage variation, and it cannot be identiﬁed whether a high wage is due
to the worker ability or the ﬁrm productivity.
Here we entertain the idea that workers “tremble” to oﬀ-the-equilibrium ﬁrms. Without specifying
how those wages are determined, we start from the premise that such oﬀ-equilibrium wages are observed
occasionally. This gives additional variation that one might suspect to be crucial for identiﬁcation. This
simple exposition is also useful to build intuition for the results in more realistic environments because
it has a close connection to the mismatch that occurs under search frictions, as will become clear in the
next section.
And even though those wages obtained when “trembling” are not equilibrium wages, they must not
induce agents on the equilibrium allocation to deviate. Therefore, those wages 푤(푥, 푦) must satisfy the
on-the-equilibrium path restriction (3) as before: 푓(푥, 푦) = 푤(푥, 푦) + 휋(푥, 푦) ≤ 푤(푥, 휇) + 휋(휇−1, 푦). A
condition with more bite is obtained by requiring for a given wage schedule 푤(푥, 푦) that there should
be no individual deviation by either worker or ﬁrm type:
푓(푥, 푦)− 푤(푥, 푦) ≤ 휋(휇−1(푦), 푦) (7)
푤(푥, 푦) ≤ 푤(푥, 휇(푥)). (8)
This is the standard competitive equilibrium notion of a matching market, in which each agent takes
the price (here: wage) schedule as given and assumes that he can obtain a partner at this transfer price.
For markets to clear the price has to be such that no agent individually wants to choose a diﬀerent
partner.
For a given (푥, 푦) combination, call the set of wages that are consistent with (7) and (8) 푊 (푥, 푦).
This wage schedule is not uniquely determined and wages range between the lowest wage that is just
high enough to prevent ﬁrms from deviating and the highest wage that is just low enough to prevent
workers from deviating.
It is important to note the implication of (8): wages are highest at the ﬁrm that is most appropriate
for the worker. Even under positive assortative matching, a worker 푥 who tries to trade with a ﬁrm
that is higher (or lower) than his optimal type 휇(푥) will earn lower wages. At less productive ﬁrms this
arises for the obvious reason that the surplus is too low. At more productive ﬁrms this arises because
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the ﬁrm forgoes the beneﬁt of hiring the more appropriate worker and has to be compensated for this
opportunity cost.
Even with observation of wages from mismatched pairs, we cannot determine the sign of sorting. It
is easily veriﬁed that in the case of the technology 푓+(푥, 푦) any wage 푤(푥, 푦) in 푊 (푥, 푦) satisﬁes
훼 (푥푦)휃 − 훼
2
푦2휃 ≤ 푤(푥, 푦)− ℎ(푥) ≤ 훼
2
푥2휃. (9)
In the case of 푓−(푥, 푦) any wage 푤(푥, 푦) in 푊 (푥, 푦) satisﬁes
훼푥휃(1− 푦)휃 − 훼
2
(1− 푦)2휃 ≤ 푤(푥, 푦)− ℎ(푥) ≤ 훼
2
푥2휃, (10)
which is identical to (9) if we misinterpret the types as 푦ˆ = 1− 푦. If we have no information on proﬁts,
as before we cannot derive the order on 푦 simply from wage data, not even after observing oﬀ-the-
equilibrium path wages. The bounds on the wages under PAM and NAM are identical if we use the
order on wages to derive the order on 푦 (in which case under NAM we assign the order 1 − 푦 to the
ﬁrms). The static Beckerian model will therefore not allow for identiﬁcation of assortative matching
based on wage data alone.
Proposition 2 For any production function 푓 ∈ ℱ+ that induces positive sorting there exists a pro-
duction function 푓 ∈ ℱ− that induces negative sorting and the equilibrium wage sets 푊 (푥, 푦) in the
former are identical to equilibrium wage set 푊 (푥, 1− 푦) in the latter.
Proof. The proof follows the same argument as in Proposition 1.
3 Mismatch due to Search Frictions
We now consider an extended model with mismatch due to frictions caused by delay. Search frictions
give a structural reason why workers may match with ﬁrms even if these ﬁrms would not be exactly
optimal in the absence of frictions. Unlike the static Beckerian model, search frictions may induce
diﬀerent behavior in the acceptance decision of matches. First, we derive the equilibrium allocation
in the presence of search costs. We relate this to the previous section and ﬁnd that there is a strong
resemblance, even though the search frictions give an explicit bound on the mismatch that prevents very
ineﬃcient matches to materialize. We address the issue of identiﬁcation of positive/negative sorting
in this model, and whether we can identify the sign of sorting from wage data alone. Second, for this
model we analytically derive the ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect. We postpone the discussion of identiﬁcation of the
strength of sorting to the next section.
3.1 Introducing Search Costs
Our model has hiring in two stages. In stage one, each worker is paired with one ﬁrm. The pairings
are random. One can think of this part of the hiring process as standing in for some connections that
workers have to the labor market prior to engaging in an extensive search for jobs. The pair can either
agree to stay together at some wage, or search for a better partner. Firms have ﬁxed types and cannot
exit and reenter to take another draw. Those pairs who decide not to stay together each incur a search
10
cost 푐 due to the delay. The formulation with a constant search cost follows Chade (2001) and Atakan
(2006). In the second stage, all remaining agents are matched according to the competitive, frictionless
allocation as outlined above.6 After the search process has ended production starts. To allow for a
panel dimension in the observations (i.e., over time, each worker matches with more than one ﬁrm, and
each ﬁrm matches with more than one worker) we assume that each agent goes through this two-stages
hiring process several times in his life.
We consider the same class of production functions ℱ . For exposition it will be convenient to
restrict the supermodular function in ℱ+ to functions with symmetric cross-partial such that 푓푥푦(푥, 푦) =
푓푥푦(푦, 푥). For submodular functions in ℱ− which induce negative sorting it will be convenient to restrict
attention to symmetry of the form 푓푥푦(푥, 푦) = 푓푥푦(1− 푦, 1− 푥).
We assume that the transfer in the ﬁrst period is determined by Nash bargaining with equal bar-
gaining weights. We illustrate this with our example production function 푓+ in (1). When a worker
푥 meets a ﬁrm 푦, the payoﬀ from matching is 푓(푥, 푦). Waiting until next period and matching in the
perfectly competitive labor market yields payoﬀ 푤(푥, 휇(푥)) − 푐 to the worker and 휋(휇−1(푦), 푦) − 푐 to
the ﬁrm. A ﬁrst-period match will therefore be accepted provided that the current match surplus over
waiting is positive. This gives the following bounds on the degree of mismatch where a match is still
tolerated:7
푓(푥, 푦)− (푤★(푥) + 휋★(푦)− 2푐) ≥ 0. (11)
For a given ﬁrm 푦 we call the set of worker types that fulﬁll (11) his acceptance set and denote it by
퐴(푦) for the ﬁrms and by 퐵(푥) for the workers.8 Similar to the work by Atakan (2006) we can show
that the bounds of this set are increasing if the production function is in ℱ+ and decreasing if it is in
ℱ−, which naturally extends the notion of sorting to sets.
For our example production function 푓+ in (1) it is easy to verify that (11) reduces to
훼(푥푦)휃 − 훼
2
푥2휃 − 훼
2
푦2휃 ≥ −2푐. (12)
and therefore the acceptance set becomes 퐴(푦) =
[
(푦휃 − 2√푐/훼)1/휃, (푦휃 + 2√푐/훼)1/휃] . Due to sym-
metry the acceptance set of the workers looks identical. The range of mutually accepted matches is
illustrated by the area between the dashed lines in Figure 2 for the case 휃 = 1.
6Here we need to worry about the possibility that when the acceptance sets span the entire type space (e.g., because of
high search costs or low complementarities), no agents are left in the second stage, in which case the continuation payoﬀ is
not determined. Without modeling this explicitly, we think of a tremble that ensures that there are always some agents
who end up in the next period. For many parameters each worker and ﬁrm type rejects some agents on the other side of
the market, and these agents will indeed move to the second stage.
7It may well be that for low types the surplus in the next period does not exceed the total waiting cost of 2푐. In order
to avoid keeping track of endogenous entry, we assume that people will search even if that is the case. This may be due to
the fact that the outside option (e.g. unemployment beneﬁts) are contingent on searching. This issue never arises when
푓(0, 0) − 푤0 > 푐 and 푤0 > 푐, as all agents than have an incentive to search, or when search costs are proportional as in
Section 5.
8Note that for supermodular functions in ℱ+ this acceptance set is identical for workers and ﬁrms of the same type,
which is a general consequence of the symmetry of 푓푥푦. Therefore the distribution of types in the second stage is identical
for workers and ﬁrms, and therefore the equilibrium assignment is still 휇(푥) = 푥. Similarly, for submodular functions in
퐹− is can be shown that under our symmetry condition when 푥 accepts 푦 then 푦ˆ = 1− 푥 accepts 푥ˆ = 1− 푦, which leads
to distributions that are symmetric around 1/2 and the equilibrium assignment indeed remains 휇(푥) = 1− 푥.
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Figure 2: Acceptance sets with type-independent search costs for 휃 = 1.
Because the surplus is divided equally, the worker obtains half of this surplus on top of his outside
option that is given by his value of waiting. Therefore, his wage is
푤(푥, 푦) =
1
2
[
푓(푥, 푦)− 푤(푥, 휇(푥))− 휋(휇−1(푦), 푦) + 2푐]+ 푤(푥, 휇(푥))− 푐
=
1
2
[
푓(푥, 푦) + 푤(푥, 휇(푥))− 휋(휇−1(푦), 푦)] . (13)
It is straightforward to see that this wage is exactly in the middle of the acceptance set 푊 (푥, 푦)
outlined in (7) and (8) for oﬀ-equilibrium-wages of the frictionless model. It immediately implies that
positive and negative sorting cannot be identiﬁed by observed wage data, because the wages under
supermodular production functions coincide with those under submodular production functions (under
misinterpretation of the unobserved ﬁrm type).
Proposition 3 For every supermodular production function 푓+ ∈ ℱ+ that induces positive sorting
there is a submodular production function 푓− ∈ ℱ− that induces exactly the same wages for workers
when we reinterpret ﬁrm types as 푦ˆ = 1− 푦.
Proof. Wages in the second period coincide by Proposition 1. Wages in the ﬁrst period coincide because
they are in the exact arithmetric middle of the wage set 푊 (⋅, ⋅) which by Proposition (2) coincide under
the re-interpretation.
For our example production technology 푓+ we get as wages
푤(푥, 푦) =
훼
2
(푥푦)휃 +
훼
4
푥2휃 − 훼
4
푦2휃 + ℎ(푥).
For some of the results it will be instructive to rewrite the wages as a function of the distance 푘 between
the worker and the ﬁrm, which for the special case of 휃 = 1 becomes particularly tractable:
푤(푥, 푥− 푘) = 푤(푥, 푥+ 푘) = 훼
2
푥2 − 훼
4
푘2 + ℎ(푥).
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Figure 3: First period wages under mismatch with a type 푦 = 푥 + 푘 that is 푘 away from the optimal
match. [Parameter values 푥 = .5, 푐 = .25, 훼 = 휃 = 1, ℎ(푥) = 0.]
Now it becomes immediately apparent what we observed above: there exists an ideal ﬁrm in the
interior of the set of matches where wages are highest. In this example, a worker has the highest wage
when matching with a ﬁrm with identical type (푘 = 0), and loses quadratically with the distance to the
ﬁrm. The reason is that a worker who matches with a ﬁrm that has too low a type does not produce a
lot of output. On the other hand, a worker who wants to induce a much better ﬁrm to match with him
has to compensate the ﬁrm for not matching with a more appropriate worker. Therefore a worker is
not necessarily better oﬀ matching with a higher type ﬁrm. In a large region – i.e., whenever the ﬁrm
is higher ranked than the worker – wages fall by matching with even better ﬁrms. Figure 3 illustrates
the wage schedule of a worker as a function of the distance to the ﬁrm he matches with, and highlights
the fact that the wage falls in ﬁrm type in part of the region. This result holds more generally:
Proposition 4 For each 푥 ∈ (0, 1) wages 푤(푥, 푦) are non-monotone in 푦.
Proof. Wages 푤(푥, 푦) are in the exact arithmetic middle of the wage set 푊 (푥, 푦). Since worker type
푥 chooses the optimal wage, by (8) any wage in 푊 (푥, 푦′) is lower than the wage 푤(푥, 휇(푥)) under the
optimal assignment. Since 푊 (푥, 휇(푥)) = 푤(푥, 휇(푥)) the optimal wages arise in the ﬁrst stage. Because
search costs are positive, all ﬁrm types close to 휇(푥) have a positive surplus and thus will form a match
with 푥 in the ﬁrst stage. Therefore, wages are non-monotone around the optimum wage 푤(푥, 휇(푥)).
Note that none of the results depend on an equal split of the surplus or identical search costs for
workers and ﬁrms. We consider the case of asymmetric bargaining shares and diﬀerent, type-dependent
search costs later. In what follows, we show that this non-monotonicity of the wage schedule makes it
impossible for a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator to detect the sign and the strength of sorting.
3.2 Inconclusive Firm-Fixed-Eﬀects
In this section we assess the ability of the ﬁxed eﬀects approach that we discussed in the introduction
to detect the strength of sorting, i.e., the magnitude of the cross-partial. We already know that due to
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the non-monotonicity of equilibrium wages the correlation between worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects will
provide a misspeciﬁed measure of the degree of complementarity. Nonetheless, one might conjecture
that some misspeciﬁcation is unavoidable and the approach might nevertheless pick up at least the
right qualitative properties. In this section we show for the most popular example in the literature
that the ﬁxed eﬀect of the ﬁrm does not correlate at all with its true underlying type. Therefore,
the correlation between worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects will also be zero and uninformative about either
the sign or strength of sorting. This result in particular involves verifying how the boundaries of the
acceptance sets change in types, in addition to the change in the wage proﬁle.
We will consider the ﬁxed eﬀect approach assuming a long panel of observations for each worker and
ﬁrm. That is, each worker and ﬁrm goes through our two step process many times. The ﬁxed eﬀects
approach decomposes the wage when worker 푥 matches with ﬁrm 푦 into the sum of the worker’s ﬁxed
eﬀects 훿(푥) and the ﬁrm’s ﬁxed eﬀect 휓(푦) plus a residual 휀푥푦 :
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푤(푥, 푦) = 훿(푥) + 휓(푦) + 휀푥푦, (14)
For this approach, we require the ﬁxed eﬀects to be unbiased. We show in the appendix that this is the
case when
훿(푥) =
∫
퐵(푥)
[푤(푥, 푦)− 휓(푦)] 푑Υ(푦∣푥), (15)
휓(푦) =
∫
퐴(푦)
[푤(푥, 푦)− 훿(푥)] 푑Γ(푥∣푦), (16)
where 퐴(푦) and 퐵(푥) are the acceptance sets, and Υ(푦∣푥) and Γ(푥∣푦) are the distributions conditional
on being in the acceptance set (with densities 휐(푦∣푥) and 훾(푥∣푦)).10 Substituting (15) into (16) we can
write the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect as
휓(푦) =
∫
퐴(푦)
[푤(푥, 푦)− 푤푎푣(푥)] 푑Γ(푥∣푦)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Ψ(푦)
+
∫
퐴(푦)
∫
퐵(푥)
휓(푦˜)푑Υ(푦˜∣푥)푑Γ(푥∣푦) (17)
where 푤푎푣(푥) is the average wage of worker 푥, deﬁned by 푤푎푣(푥) =
∫
퐵(푥)푤(푥, 푦)푑Υ(푦∣푥). The ﬁxed
eﬀect is therefore determined by a diﬀerential equation. This equation is governed by the characteristic
term Ψ(푦) that captures the intuitive aspect that the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect is the diﬀerence between the
wage that the ﬁrm pays and the average wage that the worker receives. If the characteristic term Ψ(푦)
is constant, it is immediate that the solution to (17) yields a constant ﬁxed eﬀect 휓(푦) that does not
vary across ﬁrms.11 That is, in this case the ﬁxed eﬀect does not pick up the diﬀerential willingness to
pay by ﬁrms to hire better workers.
9Our analysis is in levels rather than in log-wages. The same decompositions (15)–(18) obtain similarly if we replaced
the wage by the log-wage and the average wage by the average of the log-wages, and the qualitative results that the
characteristic part of the ﬁxed eﬀect can be increasing, zero, or decreasing depending on the exact speciﬁcation of the type
distribution arises in a similar way. Only the exact shape of the type distribution is more complicated.
10Let 푎(푦) = inf 퐴(푦) and 푎¯(푦) = sup퐴(푦), then Γ(푥∣푦) = Γ(푥)/[Γ(푎¯(푦))− Γ(푎(푦))]. Similar for Υ(푦∣푥).
11The characteristic term Ψ(푦) is constant iﬀ it is zero because the integral over the wages minus the average wage is
zero. Then (17) is solved trivially when 휓(푦) equals zero.
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To show that ﬁxed eﬀects are not suited to analyze sorting in this model, we consider a version of
our example production function: 푓(푥, 푦) = 훼푥푦 + ℎ(푥) + 푔(푦), where 훼 > 0. This yields acceptance
sets of form 퐴(푦) = [푦−퐾, 푦+퐾] with 퐾 = 2√푐/훼. These acceptance sets are independent of the type
distributions Γ and Υ. To preserve the simple structure of the acceptance set for illustration purposes,
it will be convenient to allow the type distribution to possibly be non-uniform at this point rather than
to normalize them and to change the production function accordingly.
For this example we will calculate how the characteristic part of the ﬁxed eﬀect Ψ(푦) changes in
푦. For the formal analysis of the characteristic part we focus on ﬁrms 푦 ∈ (2퐾, 1− 2퐾), because their
acceptance set as well as the acceptance sets of the workers they match with is in the interior of the
type space. That will avoid cumbersome discussions of corner properties, which can be shown to have
negligible impact if 푐 is small. In the interior part we obtain
Ψ′(푦) =
∫ 푦+퐾
푦−퐾
∂푤(푥, 푦)
∂푦
훾(푥∣푦)푑푥 (18)
+ (푤(푦 +퐾, 푦)− 푤푎푣(푦 +퐾)) 훾(푦 +퐾∣푦)
− (푤(푦 −퐾, 푦)− 푤푎푣(푦 −퐾)) 훾(푦 −퐾∣푦).
Call the ﬁrst term Ψ′1(푦) and the second and third term Ψ′2(푦) so that Ψ′(푦) = Ψ′1(푦) + Ψ′2(푦). The
ﬁrst term Ψ′1(푦) accounts for the wage change across those workers with which this ﬁrm type matches.
The second and third term Ψ′2(푦) reﬂect that the matching set is slightly changing when the ﬁrm type
changes.
We obtain the following results when the type distribution has a linear density:12
Ψ′1(푦) > 0 if 훾
′(푥∣푦) > 0 for all 푦; (19)
Ψ′2(푦) < 0 if 훾
′(푥∣푦) > 0 for all 푦. (20)
The ﬁrst eﬀect arises because the wage change induced by a higher ﬁrm type is non-monotonic: ∂푤(푥,푦)∂푦 =
훼
2푥− 훼2 푦, decreasing when 푥 < 푦 and increasing when 푥 > 푦. In this case it depends whether there are
more high or low worker types to determine which eﬀect dominates, and for uniform type distributions
this eﬀect is exactly zero.13 In general this ﬁrst eﬀect is counteracted by the second eﬀect that arises
because the boundaries of the acceptance set change. Low types leave the acceptance set and high types
join it. At the boundaries workers earn the lowest wages, and therefore an increasing density means
that the ﬁrm gains more low wage workers than it loses and its ﬁxed eﬀect tends to decrease, while for
opposite density it loses more low types than it gains high types and its ﬁxed eﬀect increases. We show
this formally in the Appendix. Again this eﬀect is zero if the type distribution is uniform.
12Linear densities imply that the conditional density is constant in the sense that 휐′(푦∣푥) = 푟 for some constant 푟, since
the acceptance sets of constant size 2퐾. For symmetric distributions Γ(⋅) = Υ(⋅) this means that 휐′(푦∣푥) = 훾′(푥∣푦) = 푟 .
The ﬁrst result also obtains for any other type distribution.
13For the uniform distribution we have
Ψ′1(푦) =
1
2퐾
∫ 푦+퐾
푦−퐾
(훼
2
푥− 훼
2
푦
)
푑푥 =
1
2퐾
∫ 퐾
−퐾
(훼
2
(푦 + 푘)− 훼
2
푦
)
푑푘 = 0.
Note also that the ﬁrst eﬀect does not depend on linear densities of the type distributions, but holds in general.
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Therefore, in this simple example with a multiplicative production function (which generates positive
sorting) and uniform type distributions, the ﬁxed eﬀect of the ﬁrm is not correlated with its true type.
It is independent of its true type, and the only variation might arise from small sample properties that
introduce non-systematic noise. While for uniform distributions the ﬁxed eﬀect does not vary with the
type of the ﬁrm at all, it is possible to ﬁnd type distributions that generate a ﬁxed eﬀect that is either
decreasing, increasing, or non-monotone in the type of the ﬁrm. The reason is that taking out the
worker eﬀect from the ﬁrm eﬀect in (15) means that a high-paying ﬁrm might have a low ﬁxed eﬀect
because it employs mainly highly paid workers, rendering this identiﬁcation strategy insuﬃcient to back
out the type of the ﬁrm. Our main conclusion is that even in a model with sorting we can analytically
show that the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect is not sensitive to the ﬁrms’ true type. Whether sorting is positive or
negative, the ﬁxed eﬀect is in general ambiguous and can be zero.
4 Identifying the Strength of Sorting
We have shown that even in the simplest model it is not possible to distinguish negative from positive
sorting from wage data alone, and that in a Beckerian model of the world, ﬁxed eﬀects estimation not
only fails to identify the sign but also the strength of sorting. This raises the question whether the
strength of sorting can be identiﬁed at all from wage data. In economic terms this is the more pressing
issue rather than ﬁnding the sign of sorting (positive or negative) since welfare depends on matching the
right types by avoiding ineﬃcient mismatch, not on who these types are. For the purpose of the exercise
we take the model literally, and see whether the model-generated data together with the assumption of
a large panel allows for identiﬁcation of the strength of sorting.
We will show that the identiﬁcation of the strength of sorting can be obtained. Identiﬁcation does
not rely on the exact simplifying assumptions we made in the previous section, but obtains even when
some of these assumptions are relaxed. Consider a generalization of the basic model, now with general,
type-dependent search cost functions and diﬀerent bargaining shares for workers and ﬁrms. Search
costs might diﬀer between workers and ﬁrms, and they vary with the type of the agent 푥 or 푦. Also
bargaining shares might not be equal. Denote by 푐(푥) the cost of search to the worker of type 푥 and
by 푘(푦) the cost of having job 푦 unﬁlled. The worker’s share of the bargaining surplus is denoted by
훾 ∈ (0, 1).
We maintain the assumptions on 푓(푥, 푦) from section 3 (symmetric cross-partials in particular).
To keep exposition tractable, we will also make assumptions on the search costs that ensure that
matching bands are symmetric and monotone, and that higher types indeed get more when they have
to wait for the second period. Symmetry implies that second-period wages are exactly the same as in
the frictionless matching model. The entire analysis goes through even without symmetric matching
bands, but the algebra becomes much more involved. The following assumption is suﬃcient to ensure
this: 푐′(푥) = 푘′(푥) < 푓푥(푥, 푥) in the case of PAM, and 푐′(푥) = −푘′(1− 푥) < 푓푥(푥, 1− 푥) in the case of
NAM. The equality ensures marginal cost symmetry and thereby the symmetry of the matching bands,
the inequality ensures that second period wages minus the costs of search are increasing in type, which
implies that higher worker types always get higher wages than lower worker types.14 We also assume
14Diﬀerentiating the wages in (26) establishes this.
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monotone matching bands which obtains if costs do not change too rapidly by type.15 The motivation
for this assumption is that it allows us to use the wages to order the ﬁrms meaningfully, despite the
fact that we cannot identify which ﬁrms are the more productive ones. While we show in Section 5
that we can dispense with the symmetry assumption alltogether and how one can get identiﬁcation
even if matching sets are non-monotone, the current speciﬁcation allows for a particularly tractable
mathematical exposition.16
We develop a simple procedure to identify the degree of complementarity of the production tech-
nology 푓(푥, 푦). What we are after is to identify the magnitude of the cross-partial ∣푓푥푦∣ in absolute
value, which turns out to be the key determinant for the eﬃciency loss due to mismatch. The procedure
makes use of two pieces of independent information that jointly identify the two fundamentals of the
economy, the search costs 푐(푥), 푘(푦) and the match surplus function 푓(푥, 푦):
1. The size of the wage gap: the diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest wage a given worker
type receives. The wage gap allows us to identify the cost of search since the marginal wage oﬀer
must make the worker indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer, thus relating the gross
surplus (the wage gap) to the costs.17
2. The matching range: the fraction of jobs that are being accepted out of all jobs in the economy.
This gives us independent information about the shape of the technology 푓(푥, 푦). To see this,
observe that under strong complementarities, output changes fast when moving away from the
Beckerian allocation. As a result, the output loss from non-assortative matching is large and only
a small range of matches is accepted. In contrast, under weak or no complementarities, little or
no output is lost and for a given search cost a much larger range of matches is acceptable.
In order to identify the model, we need repeated observations of wages of a given worker, and
repeated observations of a given job. For some ﬁrms a job does not directly have an identiﬁer in
existing data sets, and it might be more useful to think about jobs in the same occupation within the
same ﬁrm as being identical. Again, suppose for expositional purposes that we have a long panel, i.e.,
each worker and job goes through our two-step hiring process many times so that we observe a long
set of wages for each worker and for each job. In fact, we assume that the panel is long enough that
we can abstract from issues of ﬁnite samples. In this case, the average wage of a worker is his true
average wage. We name a worker “푥” if a fraction 푥 of the other workers has a lower average wage and
the remainder a higher average wage than him. Since higher type workers in our model indeed obtain
15Matching bands 퐴(푥) and 퐵(푦) are monotone if they form an interval whose boundaries are both either increasing or
both decreasing in type. As shown in the previous section, this is trivally the case when costs are constant in type. It can
be shown that for any 푓 with ∣푓푥푦∣ bounded away from zero there exists a bound 휓 > 0 such that matching sets remain
monotone whenever 푐′(푥) < 휓 and 푘′(푦) < 휓 for 푥, 푦.
16The identiﬁcation method in equation (30) does not use any symmetry of either the cost or the production functions.
Section 5 part 3 shows how monotonicity can be replaced by knowledge that costs are increasing in ﬁrm type, which
naturally happens under discounting. Part 10 in that section discusses how an adapted version of this approach can be
used even in settings that do not have any natural order of ﬁrms.
17We cannot adopt the same strategy for the ﬁrms, since we cannot rely on the “proﬁt gap” for a given job if proﬁts
are hard to observe. Nevertheless, we will see that bargaining reﬂects variation on the ﬁrms side to a degree that allows
identiﬁcation of the ﬁrms’ costs up to sign and a constant, which is suﬃcient to back out the loss from mismatch and the
magnitude of the cross-partial in production.
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higher wages on average, this recovers the true type of the worker. Then we can rank the jobs based
on the quality of their workers: We name a job “푦ˆ” if a fraction 푦ˆ of all jobs have workers of lower
quality. Monotone matching bands imply that the distribution of workers changes in the sense of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance, and we can measure the worker quality for example by the average of the
worker types employed in each job over time. Under PAM higher ﬁrm types match with better ﬁrms
and we have 푦ˆ = 푦, while under NAM higher ﬁrm types match with lower quality workers and we have
푦ˆ = 1 − 푦.18 For the remainder of this section, we will also indicate with a “hat” any function that
deals with the transform, in which case it represents the original function under PAM, and represents
the function evaluated at 1− 푦 under NAM. In particular, consider production function 푓ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ) which
has the following deﬁnition
푓ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ) =
{
푓(푥, 푦ˆ) if PAM
푓(푥, 1− 푦ˆ) if NAM .
We know from Section (3) that we cannot identify from the wages whether PAM or NAM applies. The
important point to notice is that independent of the case we are in, the cross-partial of 푓ˆ recovers the
absolute value of the cross-partial of the original production function, i.e., we have 푓ˆ푥푦 = ∣푓푥푦∣ or more
precisely 푓ˆ푥푦(푥, 푦ˆ) = ∣푓푥푦(푥, 휇−1(푦ˆ))∣. We will see below that the absolute value of the cross-partial is
indeed the relevant information needed to identify the loss from mismatch (together with the costs of
waiting).
We now proceed along the two steps outlined above to back out the waiting costs and this cross-
partial. It will be convenient to start with the second step (matching range), and then return to the
ﬁrst step (wage gap). We conclude this section with a parametric example of how to implement this
strategy for our example class of production functions and discuss various measures of eﬃciency loss
that can be obtained.
Matching Range. Assume that the costs of search have been identiﬁed from some variation in
the data. Then the following allows a recovery of the strengh of the cross-partial, and therefore the
importance of sorting. As before, with general search costs and bargaining share, the surplus will
be positive and results in the acceptance of a match provided that the value from the current match
outweighs the beneﬁt from waiting:
푓(푥, 푦)− [푤★(푥) + 휋★(푦)− 푐(푥)− 푘(푦)] ≥ 0. (21)
Given our symmetry assumption, second-period wages 푤★(푥) and proﬁts 휋★(푦) are the same as in the
frictionless case.19 Rearranging and substituting the second-period wages according to (5) and proﬁts
18We obtain the same ranking of ﬁrms if we rank them according to the best worker they match with, the worst worker
they match with, or some other quantile in the distribution of workers they match with, since the distribution moves in the
direction of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. Alternatively, we can rank ﬁrms by the highest or the lowest wage that they
pay, both of which are increasing in type under PAM and decreasing under NAM when matching bands are monotone.
19Similar to the previous section, the matching set 퐴(푦) includes all 푥 such that equality (21) holds for (푥, 푦), and
퐵(푥) includes all 푦 such that (21) holds for (푥, 푦). Symmetry ensures that under PAM 퐴(푥) = 퐵(푥), while under NAM
퐴(푥) = {1 − 푧 : 푧 ∈ 퐵(1 − 푥)}. Then assortative matching in the second period implies that 휇(푥) = 푥 under PAM and
휇(푥) = 1− 푥 under NAM, and wages are exactly as in the frictionless case.
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according to (6) yields equivalently
푓(푥, 푦)−
[∫ 푥
0
푓푥(푥
′, 휇(푥′))푑푥′ +
∫ 푦
0
푓푦(휇
−1(푦′), 푦′)푑푦′ + 푓(0, 0)
]
≥ −[푐(푥) + 푘(푦)]. (22)
The left hand side of this expression gives exactly the loss in terms of eﬃciency between matching
now and matching perfectly, since the term in brackets captures the social contribution that each type
achieves under perfect matching. Recalling the deﬁnitions of 푦ˆ and 푓ˆ above, in the appendix we show
that the loss on the left hand side (22) when worker 푥 matches with ﬁrm 푦ˆ can be expressed as
퐿(푥, 푦ˆ) = −
∫ 푥
푦ˆ
∫ 푥
푦′
푓ˆ푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′. (23)
Workers only match when this loss is smaller than the costs of waiting: 퐿(푥, 푦ˆ) ≥ −
[
푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푦ˆ)
]
. From
the data, we can observe the lowest identity of ﬁrm with which worker 푥 matches. Call this identity
푦(푥). In a long panel, it is exactly the identity where the equality is binding. Therefore, we obtain the
identifying equation:
퐿(푥, 푦(푥)) = −
[
푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푦(푥))
]
(24)
or equivalently
−
∫ 푥
푦(푥)
∫ 푥
푦′
푓ˆ푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′ = −
[
푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푦(푥))
]
. (25)
Since for each worker 푥 the lowest ﬁrm 푦(푥) can be observed, given knowledge of the costs of search
this is a functional equation that identiﬁes 푓ˆ푥푦 evaluated at (푥, 푦(푥)), for all 푥 ∈ [0, 1] with 푦(푥) > 0. It
identiﬁes the strength of the cross-partial because it compares the noise in the matching sets (푥− 푦(푥))
to the noise in the wage data due to the search costs. If the wages vary substantially but matching sets
are small, there must be a large loss in matching by slightly deviating from the optimal type, i.e., the
cross-partial must be large.
The left hand side of functional equation (25) only provides information about some average level
of the absolute value of the cross-partial accross the matching set of type 푥 workers. We show at the
end of this section that (25) provides enough information to back out the parameters for our familiy of
example production functions with simple non-linear regression techniques. For classes of production
functions with more parameters, we refer the reader to equation (30) which highlights that not only
the average cross-partial for a given 푥 worker but even variations of the cross-partial across diﬀerent
ﬁrm types for that same worker type can be identiﬁed. Clearly, the cross-partial can only be identiﬁed
at points within the matching sets, since we do not observe matches between ﬁrms and workers outside
the matching sets because both rather wait then match together.20 Importantly, for the application of
the identifying equation (25) it is crucial to obtain a notion of the search costs from the data, which
we consider now.
Wage Gap. We now show how the diﬀerence in wages for a given worker can be used to identify the
wage gap. Observe that this can be achieved from ﬁrst-period wages alone, which is important since
20It is still possible to provide bounds on the cross-partial oﬀ the matching set, because it is not possible that output
improves extremely fast outside the matching range since in such a case agents would like to match if they meet. While
these bounds are relatively tight close to the actual matching set, they become fairly weak as one departs further from
the matching set. See Eeckhout (2007) for a related exposition on such a phenomenon.
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in our stylized environment the frictionless wages really represent a notion of continuation values (see
also the continuous horizon extension in Section 5). Recall our notation, where every function with
“hat” is the original function under PAM and is the function evaluated at 1− 푦 under NAM. Observed
ﬁrst-period wages for the match of worker 푥 with ﬁrm 푦ˆ are
푤ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ) = 훾[푓ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ)− 푤★(푥)− 휋ˆ★(푦ˆ) + 푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푦ˆ)] + 푤★(푥)− 푐(푥), (26)
representing the outside option 푤★(푥)− 푐(푥) plus a share 훾 of the surplus.
Note that the lowest possible wage of worker 푥 is given by his continuation value in the case where
the surplus is zero: 푤(푥) = 푤★(푥) − 푐(푥). Substituting this into (26) and observing that at 푦ˆ = 푥 the
production is exactly 푓ˆ(푥, 푥) = 푤★(푥) + 휋ˆ★(푥), we obtain
푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푥) =
푤ˆ(푥, 푥)− 푤(푥)
훾
, (27)
where 푤ˆ(푥, 푥) denotes the wage along the diagonal. This equation already entails most of the relevant
economic insights, and therefore warrants some brief comments. Assume the bargaining share is known
or inferred through the construction that we show next, then (27) entails all relevant information for
the case where ﬁrm costs are constant. In such a case 푤ˆ(푥, 푥) is simply the highest wage that the
worker obtains, and therefore the right-hand side can be computed simply as the diﬀerence between
the highest and the lowest wage, divided by the bargaining share. This can be directly fed into the
right hand side of equation (25), which then allows identiﬁcation of the cross-partial. Therefore, the
combination of (25) and (27) are at the heart of the identiﬁcation strategy, and capture the intuitive
ideas described in the beginning of this section.
The ﬁnal arguments provide technical details that establish that the variation in the data is in
principle rich enough to uniquely back out the bargaining share, and to account for the fact that (27)
gives ﬁrm costs that are evaluated at 푥 while the right hand side of (25) needs the ﬁrm’s cost evaluated
at the lower bound 푦(푥). Clearly, when matching sets are small the diﬀerence between 푥 and 푦(푥) is
insubstantial.
To see that there is only a unique bargaining share consistent with the wage data, observe that
given the assumption of a long enough panel we identify the type 푥 of the worker and the type 푦 of the
ﬁrm correctly except for the ordering. Enough observations then allow a precise inference on the wage
푤ˆ(푥, 푦) at the points in the matching set. This means that changes in the wages as matches change
can be backed out from the observed wage data. In particular, the wage changes 푤ˆ푥(푥, 푥) and 푤ˆ푦(푥, 푥)
when one moves away from the diagonal in the direction of better workers or ﬁrms can be inferred.
From (5) and (6) we know that 푤ˆ★푥(푥) = 푓ˆ푥(푥, 푥) and 휋ˆ
★
푦(푦ˆ) = 푓ˆ푦(푦ˆ, 푦ˆ), and therefore we obtain from
diﬀerentiating (26) that
푤ˆ푥(푥, 푥) = −(1− 훾)푐′(푥) and 푤ˆ푦(푥, 푥) = 훾푘ˆ′(푥). (28)
Using these relationships allows us to simplify the following diﬀerence between the value of (27) for
worker types 푥 and 푥′ :
푤ˆ(푥, 푥)− 푤(푥)− [푤ˆ(푥′, 푥′)− 푤(푥′)]
훾
= 푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푥)− 푐(푥′)− 푘ˆ(푥′)
⇔ 푤ˆ(푥, 푥)− 푤(푥)− [푤ˆ(푥
′, 푥′)− 푤(푥′)]
훾
= − 1
1− 훾
∫ 푥
푥′
푤ˆ푥(푥˜, 푥˜)푑푥˜+
1
훾
∫ 푥
푥′
푤ˆ푦(푦˜, 푦˜)푑푦˜. (29)
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This enables the identiﬁcation of 훾 since all wage terms in (29) can be inferred from the data, and only
a unique value of gamma solves this equation.
To be able to use (25), we need to recover 푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푦(푥)). While for small matching bands it holds
that 푦(푥) ≈ 푥 and we can safely use 푐(푥) + 푘(푥) as identiﬁed by (27), adjustments for larger matching
bands might be non-trivial. Building on (27) and on (28) yields the following equations that identify
the right hand side of (25) exactly from the observable wages and the already identiﬁed bargaining
power:
푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푦(푥)) = 푐(푥) + 푘ˆ(푥)− [푘ˆ(푥)− 푘ˆ(푦(푥))]
= − 푤ˆ(푥, 푥)− 푤(푥)
훾
−
∫ 푥
푦(푥)
푘ˆ푦(푦)푑푦
= −
푤ˆ(푥, 푥)− 푤(푥)− ∫ 푥푦(푥) 푤ˆ푦(푦, 푦)푑푦
훾
.
As mentioned before, if either the variation in ﬁrm costs is small (푘′ small means that 푤ˆ푦(푦, 푦) is small)
or if the matching bands are narrow and therefore 푦(푥) ≈ 푥, then the third term in the numerator
becomes negligible. In such cases the search costs can eﬀectively be obtained by taking the diﬀerence
between the maximum and the minimum wage that workers obtain without any further adjustment, as
outlined in the discussion of (27).
The Parametric Example. To highlight the applicability of this identiﬁcation strategy, we focus on
the parametric family of production functions that we outlined as examples in (1) and (2), and consider
the original case of constant and common search costs 푐(푥) = 푘(푦) = 푐 and equal bargaining weights
훾 = 1/2. Under our leading examples 푓+ and 푓− the loss due to mis-coordination in absolute terms is
given by
∣퐿(푥, 푦)∣ = ∣훼∣
2
(푥휃 − 푦휃)2.
By (25) we can identify the strength of sorting via equation
∣훼∣(푥휃 − 푦(푥)휃)2 = 4푐
or equivalently
푥 =
(
2 (푐/∣훼∣)1/2 − 푦(푥)휃
)1/휃
as long as 푦(푥) > 0. The parameters ∣훼∣ and 휃 in this functional form can be identiﬁed by the joint
behavior of 푥 and 푦(푥). Simple non-linear regression techniques can assess these parameters. Knowing
these parameters, it is easy to compute various statistics regarding the aggregate loss from mismatch.
The simplest one is the dollar amount of lost output when agents match completely randomly relative
to perfect matching (keeping search costs constant), which is simply:
풢 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∣퐿(푥, 푦)∣푑푥푑푦
=
∣훼∣
2
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(푥휃 − 푦휃)2푑푥푑푦 = ∣훼∣ 휃
2
(2휃 + 1)(휃 + 1)2
.
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Possibly more meaningful might be the loss from equilibrium play (including costs) relative to costless
perfect matching, which is
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0 min{∣퐿(푥, 푦)∣, 2푐}푑푥푑푦 since losses larger than 푐 are capped by the
search costs. Finally, one can ask about the output loss from completely random matching without
costs relative to equilibrium play including the search costs, which is the diﬀerence between the two
previous computations: 풢 − ∫ 10 ∫ 10 min{∣퐿(푥, 푦)∣, 2푐}푑푥푑푦 = ∫ 10 ∫ 10 min{∣퐿(푥, 푦)∣ − 2푐, 0}푑푥푑푦.
Given 훼 and 휃, we know exactly the cross-partial 푓푥푦 for all pairs 푥, 푦. This clearly depends on the
normalization of the distribution functions (to uniform distributions) and the associated normalization
of the technology 푓 , but the dollar loss due to mismatch is invariant to the normalization. We can
therefore obtain an indication of the eﬃciency loss of mismatch relative to the total wages for example.
5 Discussion
Our analysis of Becker’s (1973) matching framework is rather speciﬁc. In this section we discuss
questions of robustness and relate our results to other contributions in the literature.
1. Alternative Identiﬁcation Strategies. First, we consider alternative strategies of identiﬁcation,
and relate our approach to work by Gautier and Teulings (2004, 2006). They assess the loss from
mismatch in a sorting model. Their model is similar in spirit, but diﬀerent along several substantial
dimensions. They make assumptions on the output functions (log-supermodularity) that guarantee
positive assortative matching from the outset, while we remain agnostic about the direction of sorting.
Additionally, they assume that the output is sold in a ﬁnal goods market, and therefore the price is
endogenous, yielding a model of comparative advantage where all ﬁrms make equal proﬁts. In contrast,
our model is one of absolute advantage where more productive ﬁrms make more proﬁts – but see the
discussion on entry below. They use a second order Taylor expansion around the frictionless benchmark,
which generates a local concept to back out the cross-partial. This generates in Gautier and Teulings
(2006) a constant cross-partial along the entire matching range, while in our speciﬁcation the cross-
partial is allowed to vary. On the other hand they are careful in specifying measurement error and
short panels, from which we have abstracted.
Despite the diﬀerences it is possible to investigate how the main ingredient in their approach fares
in our environment. In particular, we can show in which environment there is a natural counterpart
to their approach, and provide an extension for environments that go beyond their analysis. In the
following we consider three identiﬁcation strategies (A) – (C) that we depict in Figure 4 and discuss in
turn. In all of these approaches our exposition does not rely on knowing the sign of the cross-partial,
and we ask whether we can back out its absolute value regardless.
The main identiﬁcation strategy in Section 4 relies on measuring the width of the matching bands.
For a given search cost (which has to be backed out from the data), small matching bands is synonymous
to rejecting a large fraction of ﬁrms, which only happens if it is important to match with the right ﬁrm.
In Figure 4 we illustrate this approach as a measure of the distance between the matching bands, labeled
(A).
An alternative approach arises from the observation that wage changes contain information about
the local cross-partial. In particular, given the deﬁnition of the wages in (26), the cross-partial
푤ˆ푥푦(푥, 푦ˆ) = 훾푓ˆ푥푦(푥, 푦ˆ). (30)
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Figure 4: Identiﬁcation strategies to determine the absolute value of the cross-partial: A. Global
approach measuring size of and change in matching bounds; B. Local analysis of taking cross-diﬀerences
of two adjacent points as in (29); C. Obtain curvature of wages along the y-axis locally around the 45-
degree line.
Therefore, whenever we observe wages for (푥, 푦ˆ) and (푥′, 푦ˆ′) with 푥 ∕= 푥′ and 푦ˆ ∕= 푦ˆ′ and these tuples
are close to each other, then the double diﬀerence in the wages 푤ˆ(푥′, 푦ˆ′)− 푤ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ′)− (푤ˆ(푥′, 푦ˆ)− 푤ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ))
divided by [푥′−푥][푦ˆ′−푦ˆ] yields an approximation for the cross-partial locally. This allows approximately
the identiﬁcation of the cross-partial at any point in the matching range as long as enough wage
observations close by are available. This identiﬁcation strategy does also not rely on any symmetry
assumption regarding the costs of search or the match value function that was made in previous sections
to simplify the characterization of second period wages, since the proﬁts and wages at the second stage
drop out here by taking cross-partials. We illustrate this approach in Figure 4 by the arrow labeled
(B), which considers the wage change between two points (푥, 푦) and (푥′, 푦′). Clearly, this approach only
applies when the arrow in (B) is neither horizontal nor vertical, as in those cases one would divide by
zero.
Gautier and Teulings (2004, 2006) exploit this idea further, and ﬁnd a way to use the wage variation
in the vertical direction to back out the cross-partial. In the frictionless model, worker 푥 chooses his
optimal ﬁrm 휇(푥) such that 푤푦(푥, 휇(푥)) = 0. The full derivative with respect to 푥 along the equilibrium
path gives a tight connection between the concavity of the wages and the cross-partial of the wages,
and the latter is informative about the cross-partial in production according to (30). In particular,
푤푦푦(푥, 휇(푥)) = −푤푥푦(푥, 휇(푥))/휇′(푥). Even in the model with search frictions and without knowledge of
the direction of sorting, it is easy to show that concavity of the wage in (26) yields similarly
푤ˆ푦푦(푥, 푥) = 푤ˆ푥푦(푥, 푥) = 훾푓ˆ푥푦(푥, 푥), (31)
provided the ﬁrms’ search costs are constant. That means that around the diagonal in Figure 4 we
can measure the cross-partial by looking at the local curvature in wages for a given 푥 when the ﬁrm
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type changes, depicted by arrow (C). This approach eﬀectively relates to Figure 3. As search costs
become small, the width of this ﬁgure becomes small and in the limit only contains ﬁrm types close to
the optimal match for which (31) is approximately valid. In the limit, the relation of width to height
of that ﬁgure determine the curvature 푤ˆ푦푦 and identiﬁes the cross-partial (Gautier and Teulings 2004).
This approach resembles approach (A), but uses the limit when search costs are small and matches only
occur in the proximity of the optimal match. Alternatively, Gautier and Teulings (2006) show that the
curvature of a worker’s wage when the ﬁrm type changes can be directly captured in standard wage
regressions by including a quadratic ﬁrm eﬀect. This generates a ingenious way of capturing sorting in
a standard econometric speciﬁcation, and the coeﬃcient directly reﬂects the cross-partial. Our results
suggest that this holds even in the absence of restrictions on the sign of sorting.
The latter approach becomes problematic, though, when the ﬁrms’ search costs are non-constant,
and in particular non-linear. Undertaking the same exercise of twice diﬀerentiating (26) reveals that in
general
푤ˆ푦푦(푥, 푥) = 훾
[
푓ˆ푥푦(푥, 푥) + 푘ˆ
′′(푥)
]
, (32)
and therefore the curvature in a worker’s wage due to changing ﬁrm type does not directly recover the
cross-partial. Non-zero second derivatives of the cost function arise for example under discounting with
factor 훽, for which the loss of the ﬁrm is 푘ˆ(푦) = (1 − 훽)휋ˆ★(푦ˆ), which is quadratic when the output
is multiplicative between the two matched types. Whether the second eﬀect is large depends on the
nature of the costs – in Gautier and Teulings (2006) this does not arise as costs are assumed to be
type-independent (see their Assumption A1).
To address the possibility of type-dependent costs, one can use the adjustments we proposed in the
previous section. Alternatively, we can directly exploit the cross-partial of the wages (30).
2. Inﬁnite Horizon. The stylized nature of our two-period model was called for to be able to derive
the results analytically. For estimation purposes, one would obviously choose to use an inﬁnite horizon
model as is standard in the search literature. We therefore propose the simplest model with constant
search costs inspired by Atakan (2006). Time is discrete, agents are inﬁnitely lived, and unmatched
agents meet a potential partner every period. Matched partners disappear from the market until
there is exogenous breakup of the match, at which point they return to the market. For expositional
simplicity, consider symmetry in the distribution of types 푥 and 푦 and a positive cross-partial. Denote
the stationary distribution of unmatched types by 퐺(⋅). In each period, the output produced between a
matched pair (푥, 푦) is given by 푓(푥, 푦), where 푓 is symmetric: 푓(푥, 푦) = 푓(푦, 푥). If a match is rejected,
the payoﬀ is equal to −푐. Denote by 푣(푥), 푣(푦) the value functions of a type 푥 and 푦, which are identical
because of symmetry. The value function 푣(푥) for a type 푥 is given by the wage if the job is accepted
and the value of continued search in case it is rejected:
푣(푥) =
∫
ℳ(푥)
푤(푥, 푦)푑퐺(푦) +
∫
푦/∈ℳ(푥)
푑퐺(푦)[푣(푥)− 푐] (33)
where 푤(푥, 푦) is the expected wage paid over the duration of the match and ℳ(푥) is the matching set
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for type 푥.21 Due to symmetry the value function is identical for ﬁrm 푦.22
Then the surplus of any match can be written as: 푠(푥, 푦) = 푓(푥, 푦) − [푣(푥) + 푣(푦)− 2푐] . Matches
stay together as long as surplus is positive, and the lowest ﬁrm type that a worker matches with is
characterized by 푓(푥, 푦(푥))− 푣(푥)− 푣(푦(푥)) = −2푐. This resembles the same trade-oﬀ between current
match and continuation value that we had in our two-period model. The loss is now the loss relative to
optimal search, which for small costs converges to the loss in the two-period model (for the convergence
result, see Atakan 2006). We assume that the surplus is split equally, so the wage is equal to the outside
option 푣(푥) plus half the surplus minus the cost of search:
푤(푥, 푦) =
푠(푥, 푦)
2
+ 푣(푥)− 푐
=
1
2
[푓(푥, 푦)− 푣(푥)− 푣(푦) + 2푐] + 푣(푥)− 푐. (34)
This formulation of the wages allows us to generalize the most important points of our model: First,
a ﬁxed eﬀects model is again misspeciﬁed because the wages at the lowest and highest ﬁrm in the
matching set are equal the continuation value 푣(푥) − 푐, and are higher in the middle, leading to a
non-monotone pattern. Second, it is not hard to show that the sign of the cross-partial is still not
identiﬁed, but the absolute value of the cross-partial can still be identiﬁed, for example through (30).
Alternatively, the loss function between actual and optimal matching can be backed out by (24) where
the loss represents the diﬀerence between output and optimal continuation, which converges to (23)
for small search costs. Third, the opportunity cost of search 푐 can also be recovered in a similar way
as before, with slight adjustment: Let 휋(푥) =Prob{ℳ} = ∫ 푢(푥)푙(푥) 푑퐺(푦) be the observed probability of
forming a match for worker 푥 when unemployed, let 피푤(푥) be his average wage and let 푤(푥) be the
lowest wage accepted. Since the lowest wage is equal to the continuation value: 푤(푥) = 푣(푥) − 푐, we
can substitute this into (33) and obtain the continuation value as the weighted average of expected and
minimum wage 푣(푥) = 휋피푤(푥) + (1− 휋)푤(푥). Substituting this back into the minimum wage equation
we obtain
푐 = [피푤(푥)− 푤]휋.
Observe that the cost is calculated in the same way as before, except that due to random matching,
now we use the average wage instead of the maximum wage, and we need to take into account the
matching probability. This is quite intuitive since under random matching, the new matched wage is
an average rather than the maximum and in addition, with random matching frictions next period’s
match is not necessarily accepted.
3. Special Cases of Type-dependent Costs: Discounting and Type-dependent Arrival
Rates. Discounting is a common assumption in many models of labor search. Here we brieﬂy outline
that discounting is a special case of type-dependent search costs. Similarly, type-dependent arrival rates
21Note that we do not need to include the continuation value after the match breaks up exogenously because of the
one-shot deviation principle, which requires optimal decisions this period and takes optimal decisions in the future as
given, so that these continuation values after breakup constitute constants in the problem that can be neglected for the
purpose of optimal acceptance decisions.
22The value function 푣(푦) for a ﬁrm is given by 푣(푦) =
∫
ℳ(푦)[푓(푥, 푦)− 푤(푥, 푦)]푑퐺(푥) +
∫
푥/∈ℳ(푦) 푑퐺(푥)[푣(푦)− 푐]. Given
an equal split of the surplus and symmetry, the value functions are identical to that of the workers.
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of oﬀers also constitutes a special form of type-dependent search costs. Given this insight, it is clear
that the identiﬁcation strategies in Section 4 and at the beginning of this section can be applied to
recover the strength of sorting. Also, we brieﬂy outline that the problems when using the correlation
of ﬁxed eﬀects carry over to such environments. We will start by exploring the properties of discouting
because of its prominence in economic modelling, and then brieﬂy return to type-dependent arrival
rates.
In Section 2 we initially analyzed a Beckerian model with a ﬁxed search cost, the inﬁnite horizon
version of which is analyzed by Atakan (2006). One direct result was that wages are non-monotonic in
the type of the ﬁrm and, therefore, do not fulﬁll the assumptions of a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator. In most
search models, the cost of waiting is modeled by means of discounting as in Shimer and Smith (2000).
We therefore now assume time discounting with factor 훽 ∈ (0, 1). In this case the costs of search are
the delay costs in obtaining the second-period match: 푐(푥) = (1− 훽)푤★(푥), 푘(푦) = (1− 훽)휋★(푦), where
훽 is the discount factor. Waiting costs are now type-dependent as the loss is proportional to the outside
option: higher types pay a higher cost from delay. This is a speciﬁc case of the general setting with
type-dependent costs.
When the matching sets are monotone, then our previous analysis applies and identiﬁcation of the
magnitude of sorting can be achieved. Under monotone matching bands we obtain an order on the ﬁrms
that reﬂects their willingness to hire better workers. Monotone matching bands imply improvments
in the distribution of matches of the ﬁrms in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance and we
get a consistent order, whether we order ﬁrms by the average type of the worker they employ, the
minimum type or the maximum type. Shimer and Smith (2000) point out that matching bands may
not be monotone under discounting, though, unless the production function is suﬃciently supermodular.
Otherwise matching bands may be decreasing in some range even if the match value is supermodular.
Therefore, it is worthwile to point out that identiﬁcation can be achieved even when matching bands
are non-monotone, as long as we know that 푘(푦) is increasing as is the case under discouting.
We can then recover the order of 푦ˆ correctly (i.e., 푦ˆ = 푦 under PAM and 푦ˆ = 1 − 푦 under NAM)
even when matching sets are not increasing. The reason is that under PAM the upper bound of the
matching set is always increasing, while under NAM the lower bound is always decreasing. To see this,
consider some ﬁrm type 푦 and the highest worker type 푥 > 푦 for which (22) holds. A slightly higher
ﬁrm is then also willing to match with 푥 because the right hand side of (22) decreases in ﬁrm type when
costs are increasing, and under PAM the left hand side increases since the eﬃciency loss gets smaller
as the distance between 푥 and 푦 shrinks. As a result, the upper bound of the matching sets are strictly
increasing. Under NAM consider the lowest bound of a given 푦 where 푥 < 푦 and such that (22) holds.
A type above 푦 would also match with 푥 since the right hand side of (22) has again decreased and under
NAM the increase in the distance between worker 푥 and the ﬁrm reduces the loss from mismatch. This
means that the lower bound is increasing in 푦 in the case of NAM.
Therefore, as long as we restrict ourselves to production functions that are either NAM or PAM, we
can proceed as follows. First, order the ﬁrms according to the best worker they are matched with. If the
matching was PAM, this recovers the ﬁrm type correctly given a long enough panel at least for those
ﬁrms with interior matching sets. If the matching was NAM and matching sets are not increasing, then
the non-monotonicity will imply that some ﬁrms of diﬀerent type will get the same“identity” (because
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they have the same upper bound) and since the lower bounds of the matching sets are increasing (in
푦ˆ) these ﬁrms have very diﬀerent matching sets. When this is detected in the data, matching cannot
have been PAM, and so the ﬁrms can be ordered according the lowest worker they match with, which
is increasing in 푦ˆ. Therefore, we can recover the order on the ﬁrms at least for those ﬁrms with interior
matching sets, and the rest of the analysis proceeds as before. Clearly, if matching bands are monotone,
this procedure does not help to distinguish PAM and NAM since ordering by either the best workers
or the worst workers gives the same ranking and no inconsistencies.
While the magnitude of sorting can be recovered, we brieﬂy highlight that similar problems arise
for the use of ﬁxed eﬀects as we discussed in Section 3.2 for constant search costs. To show that similar
caveats apply, we again focus on a simpliﬁed version of our production function 푓+(푥, 푦) = 푥푦. When
discounting replaces ﬁxed waiting costs, a match between 푥 and 푦 will be formed provided the surplus
exceeds the cost of delay: 푓(푥, 푦) − 훽푥2/2 − 훽푦2/2 > 0. The matching set then is 퐴(푦) = [퐾푦,퐾푦]
where 퐾 = 훽−1
(
1−
√
1− 훽2
)
and 퐾¯ = 훽−1
(
1 +
√
1− 훽2
)
, and is monotone in type. The worker’s
wage in a match (푥, 푦) in the ﬁrst period is given by 푤(푥, 푦) with derivative ∂푤/∂푦:
푤(푥, 푦) =
1
2
푥푦 + 훽
푥2
4
− 훽 푦
2
4
and
∂푤(푥, 푦)
∂푦
=
푥
2
− 훽 푦
2
(35)
The wage is hump-shaped. The derivative is negative when 푥 < 훽푦. Therefore, the wage is decreasing
for all worker types in [퐾푦, 훽푦]. This set is non-empty for any discount factor.23 While in this setting
identiﬁcation of the sign of the cross-partial might be possible, the diﬀerence between wages of positive
and negative assorted production functions is of order (1−훽) and therefore hard to detect when agents
are patient.24
Figure 5.a. illustrates the matching pattern. The matching sets are no longer constant as before. In
general, they will also be non-linear (for example when output is 푥휃푦휃, with 휃 ∕= 1). Figure 5.b. exhibits
the wage pattern as a function of the distance 푘 between the worker and the ﬁrm. The wages at the
boundaries reﬂect the value from waiting and therefore necessarily are the same. The wage schedule
is single-peaked, only that the peak is shifted to higher wages compared to the previous section. Still
roughly for half of the acceptance set the wage is decreasing in 푦 and falls to the value of waiting at
the boundary. As we illustrated above for the case of constant search costs, going to an inﬁnite horizon
model even with discounting does not change the analysis much.
Finally, we brieﬂy outline that discouting can be augmented by type-dependent arrival rates and still
be captured as a special case of type-dependent costs. One can imagine that diﬀerent types of agents
have access to trading partners at diﬀerent rates. Maybe more skilled workers are better connected and
23It is straightforward to show that 퐾 = 훽−1
(
1−√1− 훽2) 푦 < 훽푦 if and only if 1− 훽2 > (1− 훽2)2, which is true for
all 훽 ∈ (0, 1).
24Under the submodular speciﬁcation 푓−(푥, 푦) = (1 − 푦)푥 + 푦 the wage will be as in (35) when we replace 푦 by its
transform 푦ˆ = 1 − 푦, plus an added term 1
2
(1 − 훽)(1 − 푦ˆ). This simple example shows that identiﬁcation of the sign
will be diﬃcult in praxis because the diﬀerence in wages between PAM and NAM becomes neglegible when 훽 is close
to one. In fact, one can prove that identiﬁcation of the sign is impossible without restrictions on the cost functions. If
the costs themselves have to be identiﬁed and there are no further restrictions on these costs, it is easy to generalize the
non-identiﬁcation result in Proposition 3 to the heterogeneous cost setting in Section 4. Since discounting implies the
restriction that costs are increasing in type, this non-identiﬁcation result does not readily apply to this setting, though.
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Figure 5: a. The acceptance sets under discounting. b. First period wages for under mismatch with a
type that is 푘 away from the optimal match. [Parameter values: 푥 = .5, 훽 = .98]
therefore more easily ﬁnd a partner. As it happens, the general case of type-dependent arrival rates is
isomorphic to the case of type-dependent search costs that we analyzed in Section 4. This captures the
notion that diﬀerent types may have more diﬃculty in ﬁnding a job, for example it may be harder to
ﬁnd a job for a high-skilled CEO than a low-skilled assembly line worker. To see that this is equivalent
to the case of general search costs, observe that we can model arrival rates via a probability 훼(푥) of
entering the second period of our model. Then the condition is
푓(푥, 푦)− (훼(푥)훽푤★(푥) + 훼(푦)훽휋★(푦)) ≥ 0,
where as before, the equivalent cost function is 푐(푥) = (1− 훼(푥)훽)푤★(푥).
4. Entry. The model can easily be accommodated to allow for entry of ﬁrms at a type-dependent
entry cost (see e.g., Shi (2001)). Assume that machines of quality 푦 cost 휅(푦). Clearly, as long as 휅(푦)
is identical to the expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm of type 푦 the ﬁrms are willing to enter exactly in the
amounts needed to justify the distributions that we assumed in the equilibrium analysis. A suﬃcient
condition for this to be feasible is that 푓(0, 0)−푤0 > 푐 and 푤0 > 푐, in which case the expected payoﬀs
for all ﬁrms and workers outweigh the costs of search and the additional element of initial entry costs
leads to zero proﬁts for all ﬁrms. Obviously, it is important that more productive machines are more
expensive, otherwise all ﬁrms would acquire the same machines and the ﬁrm-type-distribution would
be degenerate. While also the reverse result that any strictly increasing entry cost schedule leads to an
equilibrium can be formally proven, we omit the formal exposition for brevity.25
25The formal analysis does reveal some interesting points regarding diﬀerentiability. Note that a ﬁnite number of points
where 푓 is non-diﬀerentiable do not change our analysis in the main body. With entry, it is not diﬃcult to show that if
휅(푦) and 푓 are diﬀerentiable then the resulting type distribution will be continuous and diﬀerentiable in the frictionless
case and continuous and almost everywhere diﬀerentiable in the case with search frictions. The non-diﬀerentiability may
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5. Comparison with Repeated Static Matching. Consider the static wage determination model
proposed by Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann, and Perez-Duarte (2004): In each match between a pair
(푥, 푦) the total output is divided according to a sharing rule 훽 in which the worker obtains 훽푓(푥, 푦).
In this speciﬁcation the wage is monotonically increasing in 푦. When this is repeated, a high 푥 worker
who is matched with a low 푦 job may choose, at a cost, to take a new draw. This will lead to some
sorting since those who are most mismatched are most willing to take a new draw. Observe here that
deviations are unilateral: a worker who is matched with a high 푦 does not choose to separate, but it is
the high 푦 ﬁrm that chooses to take a new draw. As a result, ineﬃcient separations occur as the worker
is not permitted to compensate the separating ﬁrm for continuing the match. The worker would be
willing to accept a lower wage in order to continue the match. This lower wage would eventually lead
to the non-monotonicity that we see in our setting.
The important aspect is that wages are independent of outside options (assumed to be zero), which
makes this model essentially static. Most labor market models do not have this feature. Rather, when
deciding whether to stay together or to split up, the bargaining is usually about the surplus that the
pair enjoys over and above the value that each partner can ensure himself by separating. When a ﬁrm
has a high value from separating, then it ﬁrst gets compensated for its high outside option and only
the remaining value gets split. In such a formulation if a ﬁrm is nearly indiﬀerent between searching
for a more appropriate worker or staying with the current worker, then it is only willing to give very
little additional wage to the worker (above and beyond his compensation for not searching further). In
contrast, in the repeated static matching approach, such a ﬁrm would simply search for a new worker
because the share it has to give to the current worker is too large (it separates even though staying
matched would be socially eﬃcient), because the wage does not reﬂect the continuation payoﬀs.
6. Directed Search. In the directed search model of Shimer (2005) with ex post screening, com-
plementarities lead to sorting. The ﬁrms’ oﬀer strategies are monotonic, in the sense that a higher
worker type obtains higher wages from better ﬁrms. Interestingly, in that model a non-monotonicity
may appear on the worker side, since a higher worker type may obtain a lower wage at a given ﬁrm
(being compensated by a much higher probability of getting hired). Alternatively, if workers were to
auction oﬀ their labor, then the equilibrium wages oﬀered would be again non-linear in ﬁrm type.26
7. On-the-job Search. On-the-Job-Search (OJS) is another likely candidate for identifying sorting
using equilibrium mismatch. Bagger and Lentz (2008), Lise, Meghir and Robin (2008) and Lopes de
Melo (2008) consider a sorting model with on-the-job search (as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006)). As long as a job is scarce, matched pairs face a trade-
arise at the points where the matching sets reach the boundaries of the type space. When we re-normalize 푓 to be able to
work with a uniform type distribution, the normalized 푓 retains monotonicity and continuity everywhere but may inherit
points of non-diﬀerentiability. Since it remains almost everywhere diﬀerentiable, we can carry out our analysis as in the
main body, only that the assignment function may have discontinuities in its slope at the points where normalized 푓 is
discontinuous.
26We are grateful to Robert Shimer for pointing this out to us. Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) show a related result of
decreasing wages for better workers when directed search is introduced into the standard Becker (1973) model without
ex-post screening, but in this case the result is restricted to the case of NAM.
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oﬀ between matching early and waiting for the appropriate types.27 This arises because in nearly all
existing models a current match allows only the workers to search further but precludes the ﬁrms from
further matches, and thus introduces an opportunity cost for inappropriate matches. Even if both sides
can search such an opportunity cost remains present as long as arrival rates in a match are lower than
for unmatched agents. In such cases on-the-job search will aﬀect the exact nature of the equilibrium
wages, but high type ﬁrms will still only pay relatively low wages to low type workers to compensate
them for their lost continuation value without that worker. Nevertheless, the exact incorporation of on-
the-job search into our environment requires further research beccause it requires a diﬀerent assessment
of the opportunity costs of search that go beyond the analysis presented here.
8. Use of Additional Data: The Attribution Problem. Our setup does not exploit any other
data except for wages, matched partners, and possibly search duration. Existing data sets feature much
richer data, both on observables of the workers and the ﬁrms. We note here the beneﬁts and problems
in using such data. First, for the workers the additional data obviously provides an additional source
to identify the type of the worker. Nevertheless, when the data on wages for each worker is rich enough
this is not strictly necessary, since the wages alone allow us to identifying the type of the worker.
While in applications the additional data through observables reduces noise through ﬁnite samples and
measurement error, for identiﬁcation in long panels it is not strictly necessary.
Second, observables about ﬁrm proﬁt or output would indeed provide additional information that
goes beyond those contained in wage data. If such data on a job by job level is available, it would allow
us not only to identify the strength but also the sign of sorting. And while there are good data on ﬁrm
proﬁts, the problem is that there are no data on job proﬁts. In multi-worker ﬁrms, we need to attribute
the share of each worker’s contribution to the overall ﬁrm proﬁts. Even in the simplest economy we
need to decide what the contribution of very diﬀerent occupations (CEO, accountant, and secretary)
is to the ﬁrm proﬁt. Since this decomposition seems diﬃcult across occupations28, we propose to focus
on the economically important and manageable problem of identifying the strength of sorting.
Being aware of the shortcomings of the wage data in ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, some contributions have
used output data to assess the direction of sorting, as mentioned in the introduction. For example,
Mendes, van den Berg, and Lindeboom (2007) use productivity data instead of wage data. They choose
average ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity to attribute output from the ﬁrm to an individual worker. They ﬁnd
that average ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and worker skill exhibit strong positive sorting.
9. Measurement Error and Wage Proﬁles. Following most of the literature on identiﬁcation,
our insights are based on the assumption of large panels. In such a setting measurement error does
not aﬀect indicators such as average wages. Nevertheless, it will inﬂate statistics such as the maximum
and deﬂate statistics such as the minimum wage used 푤. Therefore, it might be more prudent to use
more conservative statistics such as the 95% interval of wages for a given type of agent. The alternative
27In Bagger and Lentz (2008) jobs are not scarce since ﬁrms can open as many jobs as they want. The sorting eﬀect in
their model derives from diﬀerences in the intensity with which workers search for a new job.
28In a simple matching model of the ﬁrm, Eeckhout and Pinheiro (2008) show that only under very speciﬁc conditions,
namely homotheticity in the production technology, wage ratios of diﬀerent skills within a ﬁrm will be the same as those
across ﬁrms. In all other cases, the wage share of a given skill is diﬀerent in diﬀerent ﬁrms, and as a result simply
attributing proﬁts to jobs proportional to wages will be biased.
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identiﬁcation procedure outlined in (30) can be applied with suﬃciently many data observations if we
use the average wage in a very small neighborhood of (푥, 푦ˆ) and the average wage in a very small neigh-
borhood of (푥′, 푦ˆ′) rather than each actual wage (and to the extent that the errors have mean zero).29
In their approach to estimation Gautier and Teulings (2006) propose additional ways of incorporating
measurement error and ﬁnite samples that might also be applicable to our setting. Other complications
that our simpliﬁed exposition does not take care of concerns wage increases on the job, for example
because of human capital accumulation, because of backloaded incentives in wage-tenure contracts, or
because of outside oﬀers that bid up the wages. As long as wages increase deterministically, the costs of
search can still be backed out by the diﬀerence between the highest present value of wages in a spell of
employment and the lowest present value. Issues of stochastic evolvement of wages and of short panels
for workers require more careful assessment that goes beyond the current setup.
10. More General Technologies. Above, we have shown that the strength of sorting can be
identiﬁed. We have explored this in a setting where higher types produce more for any given type on
the other side, and where matching bands are monotone which gives some order on the ﬁrms. Yet the
fact that we can achieve identiﬁcation without knowledge of the sign of sorting provides a hint that the
order of ﬁrms in terms of productivity is not crucial for the identiﬁcation strategy. It suggests that our
analysis extends to an even broader class of production functions that do not permit a clear order on
ﬁrms. While we do not have a general theorem on the breath of possible production functions for which
of our method delivers identiﬁcation, we illustrate its applicability in a setup without any clear order
on the ﬁrms. Suppose output is maximized when “similar” agents match. In such a setting there is no
ranking of better jobs. Nevertheless, we can still identify how strong the complementarity is between
agents with a slight adaptation our approach. Think of workers and ﬁrms as being located on a circle
with circumference 1. Two types 푥, 푦 ∈ [0, 1] then have a distance 푑(푥, 푦) = min푘∈{−1,0,1} ∣푥 − 푦 + 푘∣,
and the output they produce is a decreasing function of their distance given by 푓(푥, 푦) = 1− 훼푑(푥, 푦)2
for some parameter 훼 > 0 (this production function is studied by Gautier, Teulings and van Vuuren
(2008), who additionally analyze on-the-job search). In this setup types 0 and 1 are neighbors and
output of their match is high. Under the assumption of common constant search costs 푐, equation (27)
implies that the diﬀerence between the maximum wage that a worker obtains and the minimum wage
divided by his bargaining share recovers 푐. One way to then apply a version of equation (25) is to note
that a worker who matches with a fraction 푧 of the ﬁrms matches only with ﬁrms up to a distance
푧/2 away, and so 푦(푥) = 푥 − 푧/2. Given this distance of 푧/2 between the worker type and the lowest
ﬁrm type that he matches with, equation (25) immediately allows us to recover the magnitude of the
cross-partial. The main point of this argument is to show that the comparison of the set of ﬁrms an
agent is willing to match with against the costs from search is informative about the importance of
sorting even in environments with other non-monotone production technologies.
29As long as the distance between (푥, 푦ˆ) and (푥′, 푦ˆ′) is not completely negligible such an approach is indeed feasible
using modern data sets, because of the sheer amount of available data for example in the Danish Integrated Database for
Labor Market Research that essentially covers the whole population of Denmark.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we pursue two goals. First, we use the well-known model of sorting by Becker (1973)
to gain insights into the wage setting process in a competitive environment, which serves as a natural
benchmark. We extend that model in the smallest possible way to allow for equilibrium mismatch while
retaining the basic idea underlying the assortative matching model. This allows us to provide analytical
expressions for the mismatched wages in the model, to characterize the property that equilibrium wages
are non-monotonic in ﬁrm type, and to provide an explicit version of a ﬁxed eﬀects method used in the
empirical literature. We show that the latter is not well-suited to identify the sign nor the strength of
sorting. Identiﬁcation of the sign of sorting is in general impossible because ﬁrms pay wages based on the
productivity gain from employing a higher type worker, not because they themselves are productive.
The ﬁxed eﬀects approach is not able to identify the strength of sorting either, because even under
positive sorting the wages are non-monotone in ﬁrm type. This non-monotonicity is at odds with the
basic ﬁxed-eﬀects identifying assumption, and we show with simple examples that this precludes even
a qualitative assessment of sorting because the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect fails to correlate at all with the type of
the ﬁrms.
Second, we propose to abandon the attempt to identify from wage data the sign of sorting. The mere
fact that wages are determined mainly by the need of diﬀerent type ﬁrms for having a better worker
(which is based on the cross-partial and not the ﬁrst derivative) makes such identiﬁcation diﬃcult.
Under submodularity it is the low productivity ﬁrms that especially need good workers to increase
their (in terms of levels) meager proﬁts, while under supermodularity it is the productive ﬁrms that
need skilled workers most. In both cases the ﬁrms that need the productive workers most have an
incentive to pay high wages, which makes identiﬁcation without proﬁt (per job) data diﬃcult. Yet in
economic terms the sign of sorting may be less important than the gain that is achieved by sorting
workers into the “right” job. We show that information about this gain can be identiﬁed from wage
data. We propose a speciﬁc method for backing out this strength along the equilibrium path. The
identiﬁcation comes from determining some notion of the size of the set of ﬁrms with which a worker
matches. If a worker is only willing to match with a small fraction of ﬁrms, for a given level of frictions
(which can also be identiﬁed from the data) the complementarities must be large. Similarly, when a
worker is willing to match with many ﬁrm types the complementarities must be weak. This gives a
well-deﬁned notion of the dollar-value of the gain from sorting in the market.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. From equation (5) we obtain the wage schedule. When generated by an underlying production
process that is supermodular 푓+ this is
푤★,+(푥) =
∫ 푥
0
푓+푥 (푥˜, 푥˜)푑푥˜+ 푤
+
0 ,
and for a submodular process 푓− it is
푤★,−(푥) =
∫ 푥
0
푓−푥 (푥˜, 1− 푥˜)푑푥˜+ 푤−0 .
Observe that since 푤★,+(0) = 푤+0 and 푤
★,−(0) = 푤−0 , both wage schedules can be identical when the
free bargaining parameter satisﬁes 푤+0 = 푤
−
0 = 푤0. Then we obtain 푤
★,+(푥) = 푤★,−(푥) for all 푥 if
푓+푥 (푥˜, 푥˜) = 푓
−
푥 (푥˜, 1 − 푥˜). For any 푓+(푥, 푦) on [0, 1]2 we can deﬁne 푓−(푥, 푦) = 푓+(푥, 1 − 푦) on [0, 1]2.
The only restriction is that this function may not be increasing in 푦, so we may need to “augment” the
function to ensure that 푓푦 is positive. If 푓푥, 푓푦 are bounded, it is suﬃcient to add a term 휏 ⋅ 푦 where
휏 > 0 is large enough to ensure 푓푦 > 0 everywhere. If 푓푦 is not bounded and negative, we need to add
a function 푔(푦) that increases faster than the decrease of 푓+(푥, 1− 푦) in 푦.
Fixed-Eﬀect Decomposition in Equation (14)
Our residual is given by
휀푥푦 = 푤(푥, 푦)− 훿(푥)− 휓(푦)
For a given ﬁrm 푦, the requirement that the ﬁxed eﬀect is unbiased requires that the average residual
across the workers it matches with in the ﬁrst period is zero. This means that∫
퐴(푦)
휀푥푦푑Γ(푥∣푦) =
∫
퐴(푦)
(
푤(푥, 푦)− 훿(푥)−
∫
퐴(푦)
[푤(푥˜, 푦)− 훿(푥˜)] 푑Γ(푥˜∣푦)
)
푑Γ(푥∣푦) (36)
=
∫
퐴(푦)
[푤(푥, 푦)− 훿(푥)] 푑Γ(푥∣푦)−
∫
퐴(푦)
[푤(푥˜, 푦)− 훿(푥˜)] 푑Γ(푥˜∣푦) = 0,
where in the second line the double integral disappears because the interior integral is constant with
respect to the argument of integration of the outer integral and the
∫
퐴(푦) 푑Γ(푥∣푦) = 1 since Γ(푥∣푦) is a
cumulative distribution function on 퐴(푦). Similarly, for a given worker 푥 the average residual is zero
across the ﬁrms that he matches with in the ﬁrst period, since∫
퐵(푥)
휀푥푦푑Υ(푦∣푥) =
∫
퐵(푥)
(
푤(푥, 푦)−
∫
퐵(푥)
[푤(푥, 푦˜)− 휓(푦˜)] 푑Υ(푦˜∣푥)− 휓(푦)
)
푑Υ(푦∣푥) (37)
=
∫
퐵(푥)
[푤(푥, 푦)− 휓(푦)] 푑Υ(푦∣푥)−
∫
퐵(푥)
[푤(푥, 푦˜)− 휓(푦˜)] 푑Υ(푦˜∣푥) = 0
It is obvious that all transformations remain true if we use log-wages, as long as we deﬁne 푤푎푣(푥) as
the average over the log-wages.
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Finally, observe that our analysis is not aﬀected by the fact that we concentrate on ﬁrst period
wages. Assume we look at wages across all matches. Equation (14) remains identical, but we use more
data (i.e. also the second-period matches) to obtain the ﬁxed eﬀects. To derive the ﬁxed eﬀects in this
case, let 푎(푦) = inf 퐴(푦), 푏(푥) = inf 퐵(푥), 푎¯(푦) = sup퐴(푦) and 푏¯(푥) = sup퐵(푥) denote the boundaries
of the acceptance sets for the ﬁrms and workers. Worker 푥 and ﬁrm 푦 matches with probability
Υ(푏¯(푥))−Υ(푏(푥)) and Γ(푎¯(푦))− Γ(푎(푦)) in the ﬁrst period, and with complementary probability they
match in the second period.
In this case the overall ﬁxed eﬀects are
훿ˆ(푥) =
[
Υ(푏¯(푥))−Υ(푏(푥))] ∫
퐵(푥)
[푤(푥, 푦)− 휓(푦)] 푑Υ(푦∣푥) + [1−Υ(푏¯(푥)) + Υ(푏(푥))] [푤(푥, 휇(푥))− 휓(휇(푥))] (38)
휓ˆ(푦) = [Γ(푎¯(푦))− Γ(푎(푦))]
∫
퐴(푦)
[푤(푥, 푦)− 훿(푥)] 푑Γ(푥∣푦) + [1− Γ(푎¯(푦)) + Γ(푎(푦))] [푤(휇−1(푦), 푦)− 훿(휇−1(푦))](39)
Due to our symmetry assumptions on Υ and Γ, substituting (38) into (39) yields exactly equation (17)
in the main text that characterizes the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. Therefore, the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect is not changed.
The intuitive reason is that the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect is governed by the additional wage beyond the workers
average (and in second period matches this is exactly zero), and the same conclusions that we obtain
for the ﬁrst period wages carry over to the entire model.
Derivation of (20)
Observe that both 푤(푦+퐾, 푦) and 푤(푦−퐾, 푦) are wages for workers that are exactly indiﬀerent between
matching now and not matching. This indiﬀerence implies 푤(푦 +퐾, 푦) = ℎ(푦 +퐾) + 훼(푦+퐾)
2
2 − 푐 and
푤(푦 −퐾, 푦) = ℎ(푦 −퐾) + 훼(푦−퐾)22 − 푐. Since the average wage that a worker gets when matching in
the ﬁrst stage is better than not matching, the diﬀerence between these wages and the average wage is
negative. Using these expressions and the fact that we can write the average wage as
푤푎푣(푥) =
∫ 푥+퐾
푥−퐾
푤(푥, 푦)푑Υ(푦∣푥) = ℎ(푥) + 훼
2
푥2 − 훼
4
∫ 퐾
−퐾
푘2휐(푥+ 푘∣푥)푑푘 (40)
yields
Ψ′2(푦) = −
[
푐− 훼
4
∫ 퐾
−퐾
푘2휐(푦 +퐾 + 푘∣푦 +퐾)푑푘
]
훾(푦 +퐾∣푦) (41)
+
[
푐− 훼
4
∫ 퐾
−퐾
푘2휐(푦 −퐾 + 푘∣푦 −퐾)푑푘
]
훾(푦 −퐾∣푦).
This eﬀect depends on 푦 only through the eﬀect on the distribution. Therefore, again this eﬀect is
zero under a uniform distribution. For other distributions the eﬀect is ambiguous because it relies on
the density at the endpoints as well as on the integral over the density. In the special case where the
derivative of the conditional density ∂휐(푦∣푥)/∂푦 = 푟 is constant the density is linear, and so are the
conditional densities. In such a case symmetry around zero of 푘2 ensures that −14
∫퐾
−퐾 푘
2휐(푌 +푘∣푌 )푑푘 is
independent of 푌 and the terms in square brackets are identical, which directly leads to the inequalities
in (20).
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Derivation of (23)
First, consider the case of PAM. The loss is given by
푓(푥, 푦)−
∫ 푥
0
푓푥(푥
′, 푥′)푑푥′ −
∫ 푦
0
푓푦(푦
′, 푦′)푑푦′ − 푓(0, 0)
=
∫ 푦
0
푓푦(푥, 푦
′)푑푦′ + 푓(푥, 0)−
∫ 푥
0
푓푥(푥
′, 푥′)푑푥′ −
∫ 푦
0
푓푦(푦
′, 푦′)푑푦′ − 푓(0, 0)
=
∫ 푦
0
∫ 푥
푦′
푓푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′ + 푓(푥, 0)−
∫ 푥
0
푓푥(푥
′, 푥′)푑푥′ − 푓(0, 0)
=
∫ 푦
0
∫ 푥
푦′
푓푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′ −
∫ 푥
0
∫ 푥′
0
푓푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푦′푑푥′
=
∫ 푦
0
∫ 푥
푦′
푓푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′ −
∫ 푥
0
∫ 푥
푦′
푓푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′
= −
∫ 푥
푦
∫ 푥
푦′
푓푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′. (42)
Under PAM 푦ˆ = 푦 and 푓ˆ(푥, 푦) = 푓(푥, 푦), and so (42) yields (23).
Now consider the case of NAM. For this case, the following decomposition of the production function
is useful: 푓(0, 1) =
∫ 1
0 푓푦(1− 푦′, 푦′)푑푦′ + 푓(0, 0). It follows from the fact that the right hand side is the
sum of the matched pairs 푥 = 0 and 푦 = 1 in the frictionless assignment under NAM, and equals
exactly their joint output on the left hand side (see (3), (5) and (6)). Then the loss from mismatch
can be derived as follows, where we use the equality that we just derived in line 2, line 3 follows from
푓ˆ(푥, 1− 푦) = 푓(푥, 푦) and 푦ˆ = 1− 푦, and the last line follows from similar steps that led to (42):
푓(푥, 푦)−
∫ 푥
0
푓푥(푥
′, 1− 푥′)푑푥′ −
∫ 푦
0
푓푦(1− 푦′, 푦′)푑푦′ − 푓(0, 0).
= 푓(푥, 푦)−
∫ 푥
0
푓푥(푥
′, 1− 푥′)푑푥′ +
∫ 1
푦
푓푦(1− 푦′, 푦′)푑푦′ − 푓(0, 1)
= 푓ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ)−
∫ 푥
0
푓ˆ푥(푥
′, 푥′)푑푥′ −
∫ 1
1−푦ˆ
푓ˆ푦(1− 푦′, 1− 푦′)푑푦′ − 푓ˆ(0, 0)
= 푓ˆ(푥, 푦ˆ)−
∫ 푥
0
푓ˆ푥(푥
′, 푥′)푑푥′ −
∫ 푦ˆ
0
푓ˆ푦(푦
′, 푦′)푑푦′ − 푓ˆ(0, 0)
= −
∫ 푥
푦ˆ
∫ 푥
푦′
푓ˆ푥푦(푥
′, 푦′)푑푥′푑푦′.
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